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THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN MANAGING
URBAN LAND IN VIETNAM
John Gillespiet
Abstract: In recent years, the Vietnamese government has opened up its economy
to both domestic and foreign private investors. In the construction industry, however,
developers must contend with a legal environment fraught with contradictions and
idiosyncrasies. The industry is one marked by the subordination of law-widespread
patronage, party policy, and traditional customs. While property rights superficially
resemble those in Western states, ownership and development are in theory strictly
controlled by the central government. But paradoxically, the level of compliance with
property laws is substantially lower in Vietnam than in the West. Noncompliance with
property laws and building regulations is perpetuated by municipal authorities, private
investors, and the central bureaucracy itself. Many factors contribute to this widespread
noncompliance including the lack of administrative accountability, Vietnam's traditional
non-legalistic culture, and the absence of incentives for people to comply. Nevertheless,
compliance may be improved by taking a decentralized approach to enforcement which
includes, inter alia, educating people about the law, integrating the public in developing
planning schemes, disciplining corrupt officials, promoting capable officials, and
improving the writing and availability of the law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After years of central planning, the Vietnamese Government is now
actively encouraging its citizens and foreigners to rebuild and renovate
urban centers.1 At the same time, a partial relaxation of strict internal
migration rules and a growing class of urban rich 2 are generating a building
boom3 in Vietnam's major cities. Construction is the country's fastest
growing industry. 4
Private development must, however, contend with a legal environ-
ment in which "[l]and is the property of the people, and is subject to
exclusive administration by the state."5 Since 1993, the Law on Land has
allowed households and individuals 6 to enjoy rights over residential land
that superficially resemble those conveyed by Western fee simple estates.
Land used for commercial purposes, by contrast, is not so freely exchanged.
The state continues to closely manage land rights, but paradoxically, the
level of compliance with positive planning and construction law is mani-
festly lower in Vietnam than in the West. This Article explores these
contradictions, focusing upon the role of the bureaucracy in managing
residential and commercial development.
The discussion is divided into four parts. Part II surveys the history
of land management in Vietnam. Part III argues that the contemporary legal
geography of Vietnam is composed of different types of land control that
intersect and lie outside of state land laws. Part IV examines the nature of
land management and why formal rules seldom seem to work as intended.
I See Build Your Own Houses, Says Minister, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Mar. 7, 1994, at 21.
City authorities in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi predict that these cities will double in size by the year
2010.
2 See Tran Phuc Thang, Tendencies of Change in the Vietnamese Social and Class Structure in the
Present Transitional Period, [1994] 2 VIETNAM SOC. Sci. 3, 5-8; Nguyen Tri Dung, Urbanisation and
Polarisation, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., June 20, 1994, at 16.
3 After two years of boom development, the rate of residential development has recently slowed to
sustainable levels. Real Estate Market Cools, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Apr. 26, 1993, at I; Nguyen
Van Phu, New Wave of Land Regulations Threatens to Drown Property Market, VIETNAM INVESTMENT
REV., Sept. 12, 1994, at 18; To Ngoc Doanh, Race For Real Estate Grinds into a Lower Speed, VIETNAM
INVESTMENT REV., Sept. 26, 1994, at 17.
4 Growth rates reached 36% per annum in 1994. See Dao Le Minh, Vietnam's Prospects of
Economic Growth, VIETNAM ECON. REV., June 1995, at 3.
5 Law on Land, art. 1 (1993) (Vietnam). It is interesting to compare law reform in former
communist countries such as Russia where land may now be privately owned. According to Russia's
Presidential Edict of Oct. 27, 1993, which came into force when it was published on October 28, 1993,
citizens and juridical persons may buy, sell, bequeath, give, mortgage, lease, and exchange land.
6 Law on Land, art. 3(2) (1993) (Vietnam). "Any householder or individual shall have the right to
exchange, transfer, rent, inherit or mortgage the right to use land allocated by the State." Id.
Nov. 1995
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Finally, Part V concludes that, contrary to the current policy that centralizes
legal authority, compliance with planning and construction laws may be
enhanced by a less instrumental, decentralized approach to enforcement. 7
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAND MANAGEMENT
A. The Pre-Colonial Period
Prior to French colonization, village planning and construction was
guided by custom and the wishes of the local Council of Notables as
opposed to abstract laws or imperial bureaucratic instrumentalities. Neither
customary rules nor imperial patrimony contemplated individual, private
legal rights.8 Social relations at the village level were guided by customary
rules9 embedded in an oral and written tradition derived from a syncretistic
mix of neo-Confucian, Taoist and animistic beliefs. 10 Customary rights
over land could only imperfectly be described in terms of ownership, as the
village and family controlled its allocation and use.11  Rural communities
rewarded the investment of labor and capital by recognizing family attach-
7 Most of the information upon which the author has relied comes from Communist Party of
Vietnam ("CPV") policy, legislation, and interviews with law makers and administrators. The author has
been researching the laws of Vietnam since 1989, but this article only cites interviews conducted within the
previous two years.
8 See John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A Comparative Analysis, 30 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 325, 326-29 (1994).
9 In an idealized customary society, social regulation, punishment, and dispute resolution are based
upon the internalized norms and traditions of an organic community, sometimes called gemeinschaft(community). See F. TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 12-29 (C.P. Loomis trans., 1957). In traditional
societies, personal obligations are a function of race, sex, caste, and religion, and are overwhelmingly
concerned with the distribution of obligations between persons of different status. In general terms, status
systems tend to limit the initiative of individuals, subordinating private rights to the overriding objective of
preserving harmony within the community. The differentiation of legal systems according to their degree
of rationality was explored by Sir Henry Maine in his celebrated discussion on status and contract systems.
See HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 179-215 (1917); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 668 (G. Roth &
C. Wittich eds., 1978); David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIS. L.
REv. 720, 729-39.
10 See 0. Walters, Assertions of Cultural Well-being in Vietnam, 10 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 435,
442-43 (1979); D. MARR, VIETNAMESE ANTI-COLONIALISM 20 (1971); L. Cadiere, Religious Beliefs and
Practices of the Vietnamese, 33 BULLETINE DE LA SOCIETE DES ETUDES INDOCHINOISES 1-23 (I. Mabbett
trans., 1958) (Working Paper 60, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash U. (Melbourne)); Do Thai
Dong, Modifications of the Traditional Family in the South of Vietnam, [1993] 3 VIETNAM SOC. SCI. 77,
80-81.
II See Minh Quang Dao, History of Land Tenure in Pre-1954 Vietnam, 23 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 84, 85-
87 (1993); J. Adams. & N. Hancock, Land and Economy in Traditional Vietnam, I J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN
STUD. 90, 92-93 (1970); Phan Huy Le, The Vietnamese Traditional Village Historical Evolution and Socio-
Economic Structure, [1991] I VIETNAM SOC. Sa. 38, 38-43.
VOL. 5 No. I
URBAN LAND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM
ment to land. Each village also had its own communal property which was
routinely allocated amongst villagers for cultivation. The village headman,
appointed by villagers according to criteria determined by the Emperor,
12
collected a proportion of the harvest from communal land to support a
public works program and pay taxes to the empire. 13 Because the central
government dealt with the village and not with its constituent members, the
village unit behaved as a corporate entity. Where it fulfilled its obligations,
the village and its members were left to govern themselves. 14 As a semi-
autonomous administrative unit, the cult of the village guardian spirit sym-
bolized "the history, customs, ethics, legal code and common aspirations of
the entire village."'15 As a consequence, although rights in land were
distributed between family members or clan groups, a strong community
interest prevailed over land dealings. External abstract laws' 6 and their
superintendent officials had little role to play, since land was personalized
and had not become a marketable commodity.
Customary rules coexisted with an imperial patrimony. 17 Emperors,
assisted by a strong mandarin bureaucratic administration, regulated social
order and taxation. Organized authority only interacted vertically, from the
state to the family, and it completely disregarded horizontal relationships
between families. 18  Families in turn regulated the behavior of their
members, and were accordingly held collectively responsible for the wrong
12 See generally N. WIEGERSMA," VIETNAM: PEASANT LAND, PEASANT REVOLUTION ch. 5 (1988);
Phan Huy Le, supra note 11, at 39-42.
13 Le Code (1428-1788), arts. 342-387; see John Whitmore, Social Organisation and Confucian
Thou hr in Vietnam, 15 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 296, 301 (1984).
14 NEIL JAMIESON, UNDERSTANDING VIETNAM 29-30 (1993).
15 JAMIESON, supra note 14, at 29 (quoting DAO DUY ANH, VIET NAM HOA SO CUONG [AN OUTLINE
OF VIETNAMESE CULTURE] (1951)).
16 See generally Dana Sachs, Law-the Centerpiece of an Open Door Policy, VIETNAM INVESTMENT
REV., Nov. I, 1993, at 14.
17 The term patrimony is used to describe a society controlled by the personal authority of a political
leadership, where the ruling elite and their officials are given considerable latitude to manage the affairs of
the public. In such a society, plurality of political views has no place since the ruling elite is the exclusive
source of political and ethical standards. All officials draw their authority from this source. This form of
leadership may be charismatic, but in Vietnam such domination was accepted merely because it was long
established. See generally MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION 358-68,
378-81 (1964); E. Finer, Problems of the Liberal Democratic State: An Historical Overview, 25 GOV'T &
OPPOSITION 3,335, 336-42 (1990).
18 To a limited extent, the Vietnamese imperial codes protected some private rights in land. Land
owners were compensated for unauthorized government appropriations, private encroachment (by shifting
boundary markers), or fraudulent sale. See TA VAN TAI & NGUYEN NGOC HUY, I THE Lt CODE: LAW IN
TRADITIONAL VIETNAM, A COMPARATIVE SINO-VIETNAMESE LEGAL STUDY WITH HISTORICAL AND
JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS AND ANNOTATIONS 77-78 (1987); P. HUARD & M. DURAND, VIETNAM
CIVILISATION AND CULTURE 147-49 (Vu Thien Kim trans., n.d.).
Nov. 1995
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doing of miscreants. 19 Unless they threatened tax collection or social order,
the two pre-occupations of imperial rule, private land transactions escaped
official attention.20 As the central administration depended upon personal
and land taxes for revenue, village communal land and family land was
surveyed and recorded in periodic cadastral surveys. Tax collection
required a quite elaborate central administrative system to register plots of
land. Village officials, answerable to the Council of Notables,2' registered
the name of each male member of village families; outsiders were only
rarely allowed to assume full membership of a village. In theory, all land
was owned by the state; in practice, in return for taxes, villagers were given
land use rights that were sufficiently comprehensive to be regarded as
"ownership." 22 In practice, however, imperial patrimony never directly
governed 23 the lower classes, but rather allowed land development at the
village level to be guided by internal organic customary rules that had as
much to do with mysticism as pragmatic economic considerations such as
access to water, labor and communal land.24
B. French Colonial Law
When the French colonized Cochin-China (1867) and annexed
Annam and Tonkin (1884) they introduced a rights-based, rational25 legal
19 See TA VAN TAI, THE VIETNAMESE TRADITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 93-94,217-18(1988).
20 The primary purpose of the Le Code (1428-1788) for example, was to assist the orderly collection
of taxation. See Ta Van Tai, Vietnam's Code of the U Dynasty (1428-1788), 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 523,
523-30 (1982); Lan Quoc Nguyen, Traditional Vietnamese Law-The L4 Code, 13 HASTINGS INT'L COMP.
L. REv. 141, 142-44 (1989).
21 See JAMIESON, supra note 14, at 29-33.
22 Ownership is, of course, a relative concept. In traditional Vietnam, no one had the right to let land
lie fallow. If land was cultivated, taxes were levied by the village head acting as an intermediary for
Imperial officials. See Adams & Hancock, supra note 11, at 90, 91; see also H. McAleary, Diem in China
and Vietnam, 17 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 404, 408 (1985); Minh Quang Dao, supra note 11, at 84, 85;
Phan Huy Le, supra note 11, at 39, 41.
23 During the 19th century, village rules coexisted in a complex inter-relationship with the Nguyen
Code (1813-1945). For example, owners of land could lose legal protection of their right to occupancy if
they failed to cultivate and inhabit land beyond a prescription period of 30 years (among relatives) or 20
years (among non-relatives). Le Code art. 387. See TA VAN TAI, supra note 19, at 541-43. While the
emperor had little rights of governance over family land, he retained effective control over one form of
communal land (cong dien). Adams & Hancock, supra note 11, at 93-97.
24 See Ngo Ba Thanh, Vietnam 's Integration into a New Humanist International Legal Order, I
VIETNAM L. & LEGAL F. 26, 26-28 (1994); Neil Jamieson, Towards a Paradigm for Paradox:
Observations on the Study of Social Organisation in Southeast Asia, 15 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 320,
326-27 (1984); Adams & Hancock, supra note I1, at 92-93, 95-98.
25 Rational legal principles displaced the authority of patrimonial hierarchies, transferring power to
autonomous institutions that were founded upon and dispensed impersonal abstract law. It is the role of
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system which regulated important social and economic issues through
objective law in preference to customs and bureaucratic measures. 26 Under
French civil law, the allocation and transfer of rights in land was governed
by provisions that classified property into movables or immovables, 27
public and private. Because the law was the chief written record of gov-
ernmental policy, implementation required a complex administrative and
judicial system. 28
Whenever a land transaction concerned Europeans, or Vietnamese
with French citizenship, 29 Vietnamese imperial and customary rules were
excluded. The French Civil Code, applying to land occupied by French
citizens and Europeans, was administered by the General Land Management
Bureau and enforced by the courts.30  Indigenous Vietnamese and
Asiatiques Assimiles (Chinese) based their land transactions upon village
custom 31 and, in rare circumstances, the Nguyen Code.32 When the legal
law in this system to act as a comprehensive system of logically ordered and conceptually coherent
doctrine that circumscribes the exercise of political and bureaucratic discretion. In theory, this is achieved
by legally defining the boundaries that curb the exercise of state power, thus enabling institutions to protect
private rights. See generally Finer, supra note 17, at 334, 335-43, 347-54; Roger Cotterrell, The Law of
Property and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 81, 81-98 (William Twining ed., 1986);
M. HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 153-61 (1978) [hereinafter HOOKER, A
CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY]; M. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-
COLONIAL LAWS 232-35 (1975).
26 See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 78-80,
90-95 (Tony Weir ed., 2d ed. 1992).2 The manner of acquiring and losing property rights in rem and in personam formed the
cornerstone of the French Civil Code. See C. Ldwy, The Code and Property, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND
THE COMMON LAW WORLD 162, 170-76 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956).
28 See HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 25.
29 French law was not uniformly applied throughout Vietnam. In the South (Cochin-China), the
Vietnamese could voluntarily elect to be bound by French law, but voluntary election was only possible in
the center and the north in a narrow range of circumstances. Except in the case of inconsistency, the pre-
colonial Vietnamese imperial codes were deemed to apply to the Vietnamese and Chinese, by virtue of
Arrete, Chef Du Pouvoir Exdcutif de Ia Republique Franqaise, Aug. 23, 187 1. Another difference between
the south and the rest of the country was the widespread introduction of the Torrens law system of title by
registration. This system appears not to have proceeded beyond major urban centers in the north by the
time of the Geneva Conference of 1954. See HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 25, at 167-
70; see generally M. MURRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN THE HISTORY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
(1870-1940), at 160 (1980).
30 See HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 25, at 155-61.
31 See Minh Quang Dao. supra note II, at 84, 90-91; M. HOOKER, THE LAWS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA
228-31 (1986).
32 Although land registers were established as early as 1092 (during the Ly Dynasty), the Nguyen
Dynasty (1802-1945) established the strictest rules governing land registration. See Phan Hy Le, Ancient
Land Registers in Vietnam, [1995] 2 VIETNAM SOC. SCI. 25, 25-28. The Nguyen Code, promulgated by
Emperor Gia Long, was in effect from 1813 to 1945. HOOKER, THE LAWS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA, supra
note 31, at 441-42.
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systems were in conflict, French law prevailed on the theory that rational
rules must dominate and cannot coexist with competing legal systems.33
When French rule came to an end in Vietnam in 1954,34 the system of
government and land regulation followed quite different paths in the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam ("DRV") and the Republic of Vietnam
("RV"). The RV continued for the most part to apply French civil law,
expanding the system of title by registration (Torren's Law) 35 and experi-
mentation with land reform. 36
C. The Socialist Legal System
Despite incipient influence from the radical Maoist model of land
reform,37 the Vietnam Workers' Party ("VWP") and the DRV progressively
turned to the Soviet Union for ideological and legal inspiration.38 It was the
leadership's intention to modernize the country in the shortest time possible.
This program called for the methodical substitution of ancient customary
rules, feudal land practices and colonial laws with "rational, progressive,
socialist legislation." 39 In theory, the 1960 Constitution allowed peasants, 40
"handicraft men" 4 1 and "national capitalists" 42 to own land and other means
of production. The reality was somewhat different.
33 In the West, political legitimacy may be compromised where more than one legal system exists.
Cf HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 25, at 229-30 (on the diverse nature of Philippine
law); WEBER, supra note 9, ch. 3; Steinberg, Law, Development and Korean Society, 3 J. COMP. ADMIN.
215, 219-22 (1971) (on the introduction of Western law in Korea).
34 Agreements reached between France and the Viet Minh at the Geneva Conference July 1954
ended hostilities in Indochina and partitioned Vietnam along the 17th parallel.
35 By a Decree of July 31, 1925 and an amendment Decree of Nov. 23, 1926, provisions of the Civil
Code dealing with the transmission of rights in immovable property were introduced in both France and
Cochin-China, Annam and Tonkin. The system of Les Registres (Dia B6), created indefeasibility of title,
rendering inadmissible any action claiming a right not revealed in the proceedings leading up to
registration of title. See HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 25, at 160.
36 See Le Tai Trien, Republic of Vietnam, in NATIONAL REPORTS R19-R22 (Viktor Knapp ed.,
1973).
37 See VO NHAN TRI, VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC POLICIES SINCE 1975, at 9-13, 18 (1990).
38 See George Ginsburgs, The Genesis of the People's Procuracy in the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, 5 REV. SOCIALIST L. 187 (1979).
39 Id. at 195. Interestingly enough, Order No. 97 issued on May 22, 1950 by the President of State
declared temporary retention of the old colonial laws, such as the civil land law of Tonkin (North
Vietnam). This law only applied to the extent that colonial law was not detrimental to revolutionary
reform. See Hoang The Lien, On the Legal System of Vietnam, I VIETNAM L. & LEGAL F. 33, 33-34
(1994).
40 VIETNAM CONST. arts. 14, 19 (1960).
41 Id. art. 15.
42 Id. art. 16.
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After first nationalizing and redistributing land that had belonged to
the French, by 1960, the VWP had brought most peasant holdings under the
cooperative system.43 The village and countryside were the locus of this
legal change. Although little more than a series of hortative principles, land
reform legislation attempted, with mixed success, to supplant village
customary practices which had survived Chinese and French annexation.44
"In such villages, so long as the new socialist collectivities remained coin-
cident with the older and socially meaningful boundaries of neighborhood,
hamlet and village, the system worked after a fashion." 45 The Land Reform
Law was promulgated in 1953 to reallocate urban land and housing and
nationalize commercial property. By the time the post-reunification
Constitution was enacted in 1980, no private rights in land or means of
production were countenanced 46-not even in theory.
The system of government during this period differed Significantly
from those previously described. Although patrimony certainly existed, it
alone does not adequately characterize the system of land management in
DRV. 47 For example the law on elections to people's councils48 was used to
re-establish a System of local government that had been allowed to deterio-
rate during the French war.49 The system of administration was headed at
the central level by ministries, urban centers were led by city-level people's
committees, and these were further subdivided into district-level people's
committees. Rural communes and urban Phuongs were the smallest admin-
istrative units. 50
43 See J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 168 (1969). It was estimated that by 1960, 85.83%'
of peasant households had been brought into agricultural cooperatives.
44 See E. Moise, Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam, 49 Pacific Affairs 70, 72
(1976). The author has sighted relevant laws, such as the Land Reform Law (Dec. 4, 1953) at the Ministry
of Justice Information Center, Hanoi. The VWP was never entirely successful in collectivizing the
economy in the North; a "free market," albeit on a limited scale, could never be brought under control. See
Carlyle Thayer, Political Development in Vietnam: From the Sixth to Seventh National Party Congress,
Discussion Paper Series No. 5, 15-16 (1992); Ginsburgs, supra note 38, at 195.
45 JAMIESON, supra note 14, at 367.
46 VIETNAM CONST. arts. 19-20 (1980).
47 For example, the system of patrimony described by Weber applies more accurately to non-
communist authoritarian regimes, such as Indonesia. See TODUNG MULYA LUBIS, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: LEGAL POLITICAL DILEMMAS OF INDONESIA'S NEW ORDER 1966-1990, at 86-96 (1993); R. Liddle,
Soeharto 's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions, 58 PAC. AFF. 68-90 (1985).
48 Law No. 004 On Elections to People's Councils and Administrative Committees (July 20, 1957).
49 See George Ginsburgs, Local Government and Administration in the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam Since 1954 (pt. 2), 14 CHINA Q. 195, 195-97 (1963).
50 See VIETNAM CONST. arts. 6, 113, 114, 121 (1960).
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The DRV's experimentation with socialist legality l was often
subverted when VWP cadre ignored formal rules, treating legal instruments
as just one means of implementing party policy. The supremacy of policy
over law allowed the VWP leadership a virtually unfettered ability to rule
through administrative fiat.52
There is reason for believing that the relationship between positive
law and party patrimony was highly fluid. Laws, for example, were often
not publicized and could be suspended by spontaneous, ad hoc intervention
by the VWP53 on the pretext of denouncing political opponents for alleged
land reform infringements. 54 During this period, legal institutions created to
support formal laws, such as the procuracy, 55 had little direct involvement
in the legal system; courts56 interpreted laws in accordance with party
directives; and the Ministry of Justice was completely disbanded. Periodic
campaigns to reinforce socialist legality apparently did little to raise the low
priority given to the development and enforcement of law. Legal institu-
tions were not strengthened until after reunification;7 this process has
accelerated since the policy of Di Mri (renovation)58 was introduced by
the Sixth Party Congress in 1986.
51 See'VIETNAM CONST. arts. 12, 17 (1980). Socialist legality may be distinguished from the
Western concept of rule of law (Rechtsstaat) as it is overwhelmingly concerned with social compliance and
does not differentiate between the polity and the legal system. See also Resolution, Part VI, in F.B.I.S.
DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-070, Apr. 12, 1994, at 75 (translating from Vietnamese text in SAIGON GIAI
PHONG, Mar. 20, 1994 at 2); Vu Oanh, Developing Combined Forces in Mass Motivation Work and
Renovating the Work Content and Method of the Fatherland Front and Muss Organizations, NHAN DAN
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], Dec. 23, 1993, at 3 (in Vietnamese) [hereinafter NHAN DAN].
52 See Hoang The Lien, supra note 39, at 34. Cf Carlyle Thayer, Political Reform in Vietnam: Ddi
Mri and the Emergence of Civil Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS 110, 114-15 (Robert F.
Miller ed., 1992) (describing the loosening of Party control and increasing support for observance of the
law by the Party).
53 Oskan Weggel,' The Vietnamese Communist Party and Its Status Under Law, in RULING
COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR STATUS UNDER LAW 411, 412 (Dietrich Loeber ed., 1986).
54 See C. White, Mass Mobilisation and Ideological Transformation in the Vietnamese Land Reform
Campaign, 13 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 74, 77-81 (1983).
5 See Ginsburgs, The Genesis of The Peoples' Procuracy in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
supra note 38, at 188-91.
56 See Weggel, supra note 53, at 413; Ginsburgs, Local Government and Administration in the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam Since 1954 (pt. 2), supra note 49, at 196.
57 At the Fourth Party Congress, speakers emphasized the need to combat nihilistic views of law.
Law enforcement was seen as a scientific method of liberalizing the economy and preventing unrest in the
countryside. See Tan Teng Lang, Economic Debates in Vietnam-issues and Problems in Reconstruction
and Development (1975-1984), Research Notes and Discussion Paper No. 55, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies 34-44 (1985).
58 Although widely attributed to the watershed 6th Conference, 8th Plenum of the Communist Party
of Vietnam, June 10-17, 1986, a progressive freeing of the centrally planned economy has been taking
place since 1979. See M. Spoor, State Finance in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: The Difficult
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III. LAND USE REGIMES
A. Three Systems of Land Use Control
"[L]aw ... is only one component of a large set of policy instruments
and usually cannot [be] and is not used by itself."59 It is thus evident that
land use control involves-more than the mere formal application of the law.
Indeed, at least three types of land control can be identified, but it is impor-
tant to realize that they are in reality different facets of the same amorphous
land regime. The three types are:
(1) traditional land use (rural land that is regulated by traditional
customary rules);
(2) urban-traditional land use (the unofficial use of urban land
according to modified customs to the possible exclusion of state
prescribed rules); and
(3) authorized land use substantially in compliance with state legis-
lation (in theory, statutory rules apply to all land and are
administered by state officials).
It should come as no surprise that in a society where status, party patri-
mony, and rational legal norms commingle, there are likely to be diverse
forms of land control. Evidence of competing land use systems emerged
when the usually docile National Assembly acrimoniously debated land
tenure and personal rights during the enactment of the Law on Land 1993.60
Transition from State Bureaucratic Finance to Socialist Economic Accounting, in POST-WAR VIETNAM,
DILEMMAS IN SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT I Il (David G. Marr & Christine Pelzer White eds., 1988). As
first announced, the policy of D6i Mri reserved for the state a dominant planning role, but deregulated
prices and the state-owned industry sector. The subsequent 9th Communist Party of Vietnam Congress
went further, restricting the state's role to that of overall economic planner and owner of key industries,
and leaving the rest of the economy for mixed state and/or private ownership. See Vo NHAN TRI, supra
note 37, at 181-203; VIETNAM CONST. art. 26 (1992); Adam Fforde, The Successful Commercialisation of a
Neo-Stalinist Economic System-Vietnam 1979-89 with a postscript, in D15 MOI: VIETNAM'S RENOVATION
POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, Political and Social Change Monograph No. 14, 95 (K. Dean et al. eds.,
1991).
59 Yehezkel Dror, Law as a Tool of Directed Social Change: A Framework for Policy-Making, 13
AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 553, 554 (1970); see also ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 196-200 (1992).
60 See Murray Hiebert, Land of Hope: Vietnam Gives Its Farmers Greater Security of Tenure, FAR E.
ECON. REV., July 29, 1993, at 5; NHAN DAN, July 2, 1993, at 1; Yen Hung, Parliamentarians Simmer Over
Land Debate, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., July 12, 1993, at 9.
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Reflecting the growing polarization, deputies of the National Assembly, for
example, recently reopened discussion on whether the state or private sector
should be the primary actor in the real estate market. 61 This lack of consen-
sus concerning land use control is demonstrated by other segments of
society as well. Even in large urban centers, land development often
proceeds as though there were no formal rules.
The current controversy concerning the construction of an eleven
story office building overshadowing the historic Ho Chi Minh City People's
Committee Town Hall is a case in point.62 Non-conforming land use
comprises over seventy percent of all urban development in some areas. 63
Village resistance to central political and legal control is even more
pronounced, 64 at times erupting into civil disobedience. In one incident, a
group of people took control of their village in Nam Ba province, removed
state officials, and established their own temporary de facto government. 65
Unauthorized land use and construction is invariably regarded by officials
as lawlessness and a direct threat to state control. 66 The extent of non-
compliance, however, suggests tensions in the legal geography of
Vietnam's cities that cannot be easily explained by focusing exclusively
upon issues of legality. Thus, it is important, particularly for those trained
in common law, to avoid analyzing Vietnamese law as though it is differen-
tiated from society.
61 The debate surfaced in the session dealing with the introduction of the Ordinance on Land
Transfer Tax (1994). Nguyen Tri Dung, National Assembly Debates Land Transfer Taxation, VIETNAM
INVESTMENT REV., June 6, 1994, at 2.
62 The Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet has suggested that if the high-rise disfigures the aesthetics of the
Town Hall then the offending stories should be removed. PM Seeks to Limit HCMC Highrises, VIETNAM
INVESTMENT REV., June 20, 1994, at 5; contra Yen Hung, Prime Minister Yet to Decide on Fate of II-
Storey PDD Building, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Aug. 22, 1994, at 2.
63 See generally Chairman Closes Session 14 Jul., in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 93-134, July 15,
1993, at 53, 54-55 [hereinafter Nong Duc Manh] (translation of speech by National Assembly Chairman
Nong Duc Manh); Andy Solomon, Now It Is Hanoi's Turn, VIETNAM ECON. TIMES, June 1994, at 20-21.
64 The head of the General Directorate on Land Management, Hanoi, reports that 70-80% of all land
infringements have been committed by village and ward authorities. Yen Hung, Draft Land Law to Be Put
to the Test, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Apr. 12, 1993, at 2. As a Vietnamese saying has it, "royal
ordinances are primed by commune customs": in many ways the Vietnamese commune existed, and to a
degree still exists, as a state within a state operating according to its own administrative and customary
rituals. See Ngo Ba Thanh, The 1992 Constitution and The Rule of Law in Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND THE
RULE OF LAW, Political and Social Change Monograph 19, Austl. Nat'l U., 81, 83-87 (Carlyle Thayer &
David Marr eds., 1993).
65 See B. Kerkvliet, Society and State Interactions in Vietnam's Rural Transformation 13 (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, Vietnam Update Conference, Austl. Nat'l U.).
66 See Vo Van Kiet, Speech at National Assembly Opening (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam broadcast Dec.
6, 1993), in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 93-235, Dec. 9, 1993, at 66; Nong Duc Manh, supra note 63, at
54-55.
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B. Traditional Land Use
The term "traditional" 67 is usually reserved for the customs, psychol-
ogy and religious beliefs of pre-colonial Vietnam. These norms, however,
are more than a mere historical curiosity-they survived French coloniza-
tion and socialist collectivization, changing and adapting in the process. 68
Traditional norms have not remained static; rather they have
responded to and even developed a degree of interdependence with state-
sponsored rules. For example, it is reported that in some rural areas the
district people's committee may refuse to authorize land use right transfer
without evidence of family consent. The Marriage and Family Law
requires general consent between dual occupants before property held in
common can be transferred or encumbered. 69 When determining whether
transferors have made adequate provision for their families, local officials
rely on customary norms which treat land as part of the social relations
between people.70
The state continues to prescribe what is or is not permissible; custom-
ary practices only appear to conform where expedient, developing their own
parallel procedures in all other circumstances. Traditional land use may be
temporarily suppressed, but recent history clearly demonstrates that as soon
as incompatible laws are relaxed, customs rebound, albeit in a modified
form.71 Although this phenomenon no doubt exists in all societies, 72 it is
arguably stronger in one like Vietnam where a rational rights-based legal
67 The term "traditional" is often used to refer to that period of Vietnamese history prior to French
colonization, when a long process of blending indigenous Vietnamese culture with Chinese and Southeast
Asian influences had produced, at least in the North, a relatively homogeneous society. See generally
JAMIESON, supra note 14, at 11-12 (describes, by implication, traditional values in terms of pre-colonial
concepts, such as neo-Confucianism and yin-yang).
68 See Do Thai Dong, supra note 10, at 85-89. See also Tuong Lai, The Role ofindividuality in
Vietnam's Emerging Dynamism Amidst Recent Renovation, [1993] 2 VIETNAM SOC. SCI. 10, 13-15
(examining, e.g., the special position of the family in oriental culture under the influence of Confucianism).
69 Marriage and Family Law (1986), art. 15.
70 Interview with Mai Xuan Yen, Chief Inspector, General Department of Land Management, in
Hanoi, Vietnam (Jan. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Mai Xuan Yen Interview].
71 See Tuong Lai, supra note 68, at 10, 12.
72 The phenomenon is most pronounced when one country attempts to adopt cross-cultural laws.
See generally ANN SEIDMAN & ROBERT SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 44-46
(1994).
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system is unfamiliar to most people73 and is arguably not particularly
successful in guiding human behavior. 74
With the possible exception of remote pockets of swiddening (slash-
and-bum farming),75 agriculture is influenced to varying degrees by state
law. Rural land policy is primarily driven by a desire to improve produc-
tivity and preserve social stability.76 More recently, however, with the
routine allotment of collectivized land for private use, 77 the influence of
district people's committees over farm production has waned, allowing
patriarchal village elders and farm organizations7s room to fill the power
vacuum.
Even at the height of collectivization, the state did not, and could not,
control all aspects of peoples lives; this left customary values to fill the
gaps. Village leaders now draw upon this syncretistic mix of social norms
to develop community standards in diverse areas such as social welfare,
criminal behavior, land control and dispute resolution.79 However, the state
notionally maintains exclusive control over all rights attached to land. The
allotment of land and any change in use or occupation requires the consent
of district-level people's committees 80 which administer regulations 8l
73 See Gillespie, supra note 8, at 326-33.
74 See infra part III.D.2-3.
75 Swiddening has historically been less affected by formal regulations. See Murray Hiebert,
Dynamics of Despair, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 23, 1992, at 30-31; Nguyen Tan Dac, The Village As the
Highest Level of Social Organisation in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, [1990] 2 VIETNAM SOC. SC.
35, 36-40. For a more culturally sensitive policy, see Vo Quy, Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam: Culture,
Environment and Development, [1995] 2 VIETNAM SOC. SCI. 84, 84-88.
76 Interview with Phan Huu Chi, Director of Leadco, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Feb. 4 & 13, 1993 and Feb.
2, 1994) [hereinafter Phan Huu Chi Interview]. See also the debates by the national assembly in NHAN
DAN, Mar. 20, 1992, at 2-3.
77 Land used for rice production is allocated for a period of seven years, longer term crops for a
period of 20. In some provinces, over 90% of rural land has been allotted. See Nguyen Qui Binh, Real
Estate Laws in Vietnam, in VIETNAM AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 64, at 156-58; Land Transferred
to Farmers in 47 Provinces (Hanoi VNA, Jan. 8, 1994), in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-006, Jan. 10,
1994, at 55. One and a half million land use certificates have been granted to farmer households,
representing 14% of all land designated for allotment.
78 Do Thai Dong, supra note 10, at 77, 87; A. Fforde & S. Seneque, Vietnam--the Economy and the
Countryside: Does Rural Development Policy Really Matter? 27-29 (1993) (unpublished manuscript,
Research School of Pacific Studies, Austl. Nat'l U.).
79 See Tran Thi Van Anh, Some Social and Institutional Changes in the Rural Area of Vietnam 4-6
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, Vietnam Update Conference 1993, Austl. Nat'l U). The state recognizes
that the law does not have answers for all matters and is starting to encourage local resolution of
neighborhood disputes. See Vu Oanh, Great National Unity in the New Situation and Tasks (NHAN DAN,
Feb. 4, 1994, at 3-4), translated in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-046, Mar. 9, 1994, at 57.
80 Law on Land, arts. 20, 31 (1993).
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passed pursuant to the Law on Land 1993. In short, land users look inwards
at customary values for social guidance, and where possible avoid external,
state land controls.8 2
With a burgeoning rural population causing a huge demand for
land,8 3 the state has recently abandoned its relatively benign governance of
traditional land use in favor of direct intervention. Minority assertion of
customary rights over land directly conflicts with state laws that foster
massive lowland immigration. 4 The redistribution of land to individual
households has also tended to exacerbate long-standing tensions by frag-
menting and personalizing competing claims for land.85 The state's current
policy contrasts with its former recognition that mastery over traditions,
customs, and habits must rest with ethnic groups.8 6
State intervention has taken three forms. In the first place, institu-
tions have been created by legislation to manage forest preservation.8 7
Secondly, district level People's Committees have initiated land manage-
ment programs that offer direct assistance.8 8  These programs resettle
farmers outside of sensitive forest areas and retrain them to use intensive
agricultural techniques. Authorities acknowledge that minority hill tribes
have little experience with instrumentalist rule89 and as a result have
81 See, e.g., Decree No. 64-CP, Regulations on Allocation of Land to Households and Individuals for
Stable and Long Term Use for the Purpose of Agricultural Production, Office of Government, arts. 7-11
(Sept. 27, 1993).
82 Interview with Nguyen Khai, Deputy Chief of the Inspection Department, General Department of
Land Management, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Sept. 9. 1994) [hereinafter Nguyen Khai Interview].
83 For example, out of Gia Lia's (a highland province) current population of 720,000, about 200,000
have migrated from the lowlands since 1945. Murray Hiebert, Travelling Trash: Vietnam's Environment
Under Attack From All Quarters, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 3, 1994. available in WESTLAW, FEER
Library; Nguyen Ngoc Lung, Forests in Vietnam-Present and Future, 33 VIETNAM COURIER, July 1992,
at 10-11; GERALD HICKEY, FREE IN THE FOREST: ETHNO-HISTORY OF THE VIETNAMESE CENTRAL
HIGHLANDS 1954-1976, at 287 (1982).
84 Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70.
85 See generally Grant Evans. Internal Colonialism in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, SOJOURN,
Aug. 7, 1992, at 274-304.
86 Shortly after Vietnam obtained independence from France, the DRV established autonomous
ethnic minority zones; the state forbade local authorities from using administrative fiat and coercion as a
means of engineering social change. See George Ginsburgs, Local Government and Administration in the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam Since 1954 (pt. I), 12 CHINA Q. 211, 217 (1962).
87 Law on Forest Protection and Development, arts. 8-12, 28, 29 (1991) (creating a system of dual
administration by the Ministry of Forestry and the appropriate provincial, district level People's
Committee; it should be noted that criminal penalties may apply for illegal logging or forest clearance).
See Violating regulations concerning forest management and protection, PENAL CODE OF THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, art. 181 (1986) (amended 1992) [hereinafter PENAL CODE]; Law on Protection of
the Environment, arts. 12, 29(l) (1994) (forbidding the lighting of forest fires).
88 Law on Forest Protection and Development, art. 21 (1991).
89 Phan Huu Chi Interview, supra note 76.
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adopted a policy of direct administrative intervention in preference to guid-
ance through formal rules. In any event, enforcement bodies are chronically
understaffed and are consequently unable to enforce prescriptive regula-
tions.90 Even if more resources were available to monitor compliance,
swiddening farmers are among the poorest in a poor country and probably
possess insufficient resources to survive the transition to intensive agricul-
ture unaided by the state. Thirdly, in an attempt to inculcate state policy9'
on forest protection, a program of practical and moral education is carried
out by mass organizations and party branches. 92 The Legal Research
Institute attached to the Ministry of Justice, for example, translated
segments of the Law on Land 1993 and Law on Forest Protection and
Development 1991 into local dialects, using poetry and song to communi-
cate the law in a culturally appropriate manner.93
C. Urban-Traditional Land Use
Traditional land use practices are not confined to the countryside and
intermingle with urban values and legal practices, creating what has been
termed urban-traditional land use. There is no clear demarcation between
urban-traditional land use and noncompliance with authorized land use.
These concepts overlap in at least three ways. First, people may have a
relationship with land that falls within both categories. For example, land is
often lawfully acquired, later to be improved with an illegally constructed
house. Second, the mechanical trappings of legality may be satisfied even
though the land transaction is infused with rights and duties that are tradi-
tional in nature. Third, land records may not always clearly indicate
whether land has been allotted for private purposes or remains under state
management.94 In this legal twilight, multiple notions of land use can
90 See Hiebert, Travelling Trash: Vietnam's Environment Under Attack From All Quarters, supra
note 83.
91 Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70. See Vo VAN KIET, VIETNAM IN 1993 AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR 1994-1995, at 18-19 (1993).
92 See Vo Van Kiet Meets the Giang Officials (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam broadcast, Mar. 22, 1994), in
F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-057, Mar. 24, 1994. at 42, 43.
93 Interview with Hoan Lien, Vice Director, Legal Research Institute, in Hanoi, Vietnam (June 20,
1994).
94 Even in urban areas cadastral maps may not accurately delineate land boundaries. See Nguyen
Qui Binh, Recent Changes in Vietnam's Real Estate Laws 60, 66-67 (Nov. 8, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript); Richard Browne, From Paddy Field to Province, in Environment, State and Society in Asia:
The Legacy of the Twentieth Century 19-20 (July 13-16, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, Murdoch
University, Australia).
VOL. 5 No. I
URBAN LAND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM
coexist. This does not mean that urban-traditional land use is merely illegal
land use by another name, or conversely that all illegal land use is automati-
cally urban-traditional in nature. On the contrary, where illegality is the
norm and compliance a fringe phenomenon (such as on the outskirts of
Hanoi95 and Hue9 6 where over seventy percent of houses are built on farm
land that has been illegally sold), it is conceivable that a parallel land
control regime coexists with the state system.97 Legality is, of course, a
relative concept and in a nation like Vietnam which lacks a well-defined
rule of law, integrated legislation, and strong instrumental enforcement, 98 it
is especially important to examine legitimacy from the perspective of the
occupier as well as the bureaucracy.
The state's response to urban-traditional land use lacks cohesion.
The Interior Ministry, for example, spasmodically enforces residency rules
against transient squatters, thus denying unregistered rural workers an abil-
ity to earn a livelihood in urban centers. 99 A police campaign in Hanoi, for
instance, has recently de-registered cyclo-drivers who have not obtained
proper residency cards from the responsible district-level people's commit-
tees. 100  Enforcement appears to depend upon competing political
considerations. Plentiful labor is required for the urban construction indus-
try, but single male workers squat in building sites, park land, and state
residential apartments, creating a perceived threat to civil order.
Long term illegal occupation and/or construction attracts a different
response. It is true that Vietnam has so far avoided large squatter settle-
ments that are an urban determinate in some large Southeast Asian cities.
95 See Hai Thanh, Rampant Illegal Construction Turning West Lake Suburb into Chaotic Sprawl,
VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Nov. 8, 1993, at 24. A survey shows that since the end of 1992, 150 of 170
new houses erected in an area on the outskirts of Hanoi were built without permits. Id
96 See NHAN DAN, Apr. 17, 1993-
97 On the other hand, it cannot be said that the authorized legal system does not exist. Legal systems
can exist even though the vast majority of the population abhors them and violates the law at every
opportunity. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 109-14 (1961).
98 See A. Wohlegemoth, Socialism, Market and the Law in Vietnam, VIETNAM NEWS, Dec. 25, 1992,
at 8 (book review); Orientations for the Building and Perfection of the Vietnam Socialist Republic State, I
VIETNAM L. & LEGAL F. 3, 4-5 (Mar. 1995).
99 Interview with Duong Dang Hue, Deputy Director, Department of Civil and Economic
Legislation, Ministry of Justice, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Jan. 17, 1994 and Feb. 3, 1994) [hereinafter Duong
Dang Hue Interview]. See generally Paul Cleary, Hanoi Tries to Drive Army of Job-Seekers off Streets.
AUSTL. FIN. REV., Mar. 29. 1995, at 10: Nguyen Tri Dung, supra note 2.
100 Police rely on general public disorder or infringement of population registration papers
provisions to prosecute offenders. See PENAL CODE, arts. 198, 211 (1986) (amended 1992) (Vietnam).
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Strict internal travel rules' 01 have put a partial brake upon rural migration.
Despite tight controls, the search for work and the lure of urban life is irre-
sistible. Makeshift accommodation can be seen along the waterways,102
city fringe 03 of Ho Chi Minh City, and the banks of the Red River in
Hanoi.104 State housing also accommodates unauthorized rural migrants,
causing one Hanoi planner to lament that without constant bureaucratic
supervision, "the high-rise flats of 'socialism' are reversing back to being
rural villages."' 10 5 Almost by definition, official land law cannot apply to
squatter settlements, since the Penal Code 0 6 declares this form of occupa-
tion unlawful.
Official management of development between the levee embankment
and the Red River in eastern Hanoi is representative of the state's response
to illegal occupation and construction. This area is flood-prone and has
been reserved for park land in the Master Plan Hanoi 2010.107 According
to the Master Plan, residents will eventually be resettled and there is a ban
on further construction and the sale of existing land use rights.108 Not
surprisingly, property values substantially decreased once the plan was
made public. In order to minimize their loss, residents are selling their
houses illegally to those seeking low-cost accommodation. Average land
101 Vietnam has a long tradition of household and work registration systems. Village heads policed
migration and prevented peasant mobility. See Nguyen Ngoc Huy & Ta Van Tai, The Vietnamese Texts, in
I THE LAWS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PRE-MODERN TExTS 464-69 (M. Hooker ed., 1986). Now, the
Interior Ministry, through the police force, controls population movement. A resident of a rural district
must have accommodation and a job before an urban people's committee is permitted to issue a residency
permit. Interview with Nguyen Nhu Phat, Deputy Director, Center for Comparative Law, Institute of State
and Law, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Feb. I & 3, 1993 and Sept. 27, 1994) [hereinafter Nguyen Nhu Phat].
102 Forty thousand shanty houses built along or near canals in Ho Chi Minh City are destined for
eventual demolition, according to Ngo Xuan Loc, Minister for Construction. See Build Your Own Houses,
Says Minister, supra note I; Housing Program Needs Much Support, VIETNAM NEWS, Sept. 1I, 1994, at 2.
103 Illegal substandard houses are still being built on the former Go Vap Golf Course in Ho Chi
Minh City. See Nguyen Ngoc Chinh, City's Last Major Plot of Land' Golf Course or Park?, VIETNAM
INVESTMENT REV., May 30. 1994, at 9.
104 Nguyen Tri Dung, supra note 2, at 16; Hong Sam, City Leaders Check Frenzied Construction
on Red River, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Feb. 13, 1995, at 3.
105 Residential Architecture and Construction by Individual Resident Investors, 2 KIEN TRUC
[VIETNAMESE ARCHITECTS ASS'N. MAG.] 17-22 (1991).
106 See PENAL CODE, art. 214. Lawfulness is used here in the narrow sense of non-compliance with
legislation, but it should be recognized that in a society with diverse and transitional forms of land use, one
law cannot simultaneously address all levels of development with equal efficiency.
107 The Master Plan was approved by the Office of Government as the overall plan for the
development of Hanoi until the year 2010. Hanoi Masterplan Gets Approval, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV.,
Feb. 13, 1995, at 26. See Nguyen Tri Dung, Will Hanoi Masterplan Quell Construction Chaos?, VIETNAM
INVESTMENT REV.. May 30, 1994, at 16.
108 Interview with Nguyen Ngoc Khoi, Director, National Institute of Urban and Regional
Planning, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Feb. 3, 1994 and Sept. 13. 1994) [hereinafter Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview].
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prices are thought to be higher than government compensation' 09 rates, but
considerably less than the market value for land in comparable districts.
The area is also attracting small substandard housingl"0 which is illegally
constructed on previously unused land.
There is little point in trying to register an unlawful transaction.
Official illegality, however, has not deterred residents from creating their
own land tenure system, which documents occupation and transfer.I
Occupants often use photocopies of official pro forma certificates of land
use and house ownership documents for this purpose, even affixing official
looking seals. 112 As purchasers are reportedly well aware that these docu-
ments are not "official,"" 13 there appears to be no overt deception; rather,
ritual is used to dignify illegal transactions with the trappings of respect-
ability. Public confidence in this unauthorized land use system is evinced
by high levels of construction; indeed, in most respects, it is more attractive
than the authorized land system. For example, transfer and land tax is
avoided, there are no delays or costs associated with building approvals, and
as banks rarely lend for domestic housing, 114 the lack of access to official
credit is not in practice a disadvantage. Moreover, with the exception of
electricity, many rural and semi-rural houses have no access to government
utilities, rendering the Government's threat to withhold the supply of utili-
ties and sewage to illegal housing an ineffective deterrent. 115 Reversing its
aim of reducing population density by lowering the value of land, the
109 The state must pay compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land use rights and lawfully
owned improvements, but there is no statutory obligation to compensate at market value. See Law on
Land, art. 28 (1993); Decree 90-CP, Compensation for Government Appropriation of Land, Office of
Government (July 18, 1994). The actual quantum of compensation is set quite low; it is set forth in tables
contained in Decree 87-CP, Stipulating Price List of Categories of Land, Office of Government, art. 4
(Aug. 17, 1994).
110 Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview, supra note 108: Interview with Ngo Trung Hai, Architect,
National Institute for Urban and Regional Planning, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Feb. 3, 1994). Unlawful
construction on state land also attracts criminal prosecution. See PENAL CODE, art. 214.
I11 See Nguyen Qui Binh, supra note 94; Yen Hung, supra note 62.
112 Interview with Nguyen Lan, Chief Architect, Hanoi People's Committee, in Hanoi, Vietnam
(July 1, 1994) [hereinafter Nguyen Lan Interview]. The author has personally sighted these documents.
113 Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview. supra note 108.
114 The Governor of the State Bank issued Decision No. 15/QD-NHI Promulgating Regulations on
the Deposit of Savings for the Purpose of Housing Construction (Feb. 2, 1994). A borrower's funds must
be held at a low rate of interest for twelve months before a loan can be issued; the rate of home lending has
not recently increased. Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview, supra note 108; Ngo Trung Hai Interview, supra
note 110.
115 Many illegal houses are unlawfully connected to the electricity supply, or legally share a party-
meter. Interview with Phan Dinh Dai, Director, Dept. for Construction Management, in Hanoi, Vietnam
(Feb. 5, 1994 and Sept. 16, 1994) [hereinafter Phan Dinh Dai Interview].
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Master Plan has been directly responsible for -increasing the pace of
construction along the Red River.
A patchwork of non-conforming development has created an interest-
ing social phenomenon all over Vietnam. Pockets of urban land, usually
located on the city fringe where villagers are prepared to illegally sell land
to developers, do not strictly adhere to traditional norms and at the same
time lie outside of the authorized land regime. Seemingly undeterred by
their precarious tenure, squatters and unauthorized developers continue to
purchase and sell land. Without positive law to guide their behavior, they
look to other norms embodying mutually recognizable, community stan-
dards to regulate neighborhood disputes and land transactions. Some form
of social control is necessary for any community to function.
Commentators 16 argue that these norms are based on village
customs, modified for urban living. This view assumes that most law
breakers are rural migrants. It is equally possible that urban traditional
norms mimic land controls found in current legislation as well as those in
the French Colonial and pre-colonial periods of the DRV. If this proposi-
tion is correct, laws are likely to have intermingled in such a way that
urban-traditional norms vary between localities.' 17 Such a model is consis-
tent with Vietnam's disparate history of land control118 and its highland-
lowland, north-south1 9 geographical and cultural divide. It is unrealistic to
expect the current land regime to harmonize centuries of provincialism,
especially since the Land Law has only recently been enacted and remains
largely undefined by subordinate legislation,120 policy pronouncements, and
academic commentary. An unknowable law is unlikely to attract support.
In the meantime, unauthorized land use flourishes in an environment where
mutual rights and obligations embedded in community norms are
116 Nguyen Lan Interview, supra note 112; Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview, supra note 108.
117 The author is unaware of any systematic research in this area and bases this postulation on
conversations with many land officials and residents of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
118 Seesuprapartl.
119 Do Thai Dong, supra note 10, at 77, 81, 87.
120 The Law on Land was enacted in July 1993 and came into force October 15 of that year. To
date, only a few supporting decrees have been enacted, for example, Decree No 64-CP, On the Enactment
of Regulations on the Allocation of Land to Households and Individuals for Stable and Long-time Use for
the Purpose of Agricultural Production (Sept. 27, 1993); Decree No. 60-CP, Ownership of Residential
Housing and Right to Use Land in Urban Areas (July 5, 1994); Decree No. 87-CP, Stipulating Price List of
Categories of Land (Aug. 17, 1994); Decree No. 90-CP, Promulgating Regulations on Compensation upon
the State Recovery of Land for the Purpose of National Defence, Security, National Interests, Public
Interests (Aug. 17, 1994).
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unsupported by state agencies. This is the phenomenon of urban-traditional
land use.
Although a private system of transfer, construction, boundary demar-
cation, and dispute resolution has developed without much reference to the
instrumental arms of the state, mass movements are active in these
communities, and police haphazardly enforce residential registration
laws.121 Otherwise, regulatory authorities, 122 until recently, have not
enforced laws that prohibit illegal construction and land transfer with much
rigor.123 Corruption and administrative inefficiency are the favored expla-
nations for past inaction. 124 Official tolerance was undoubtedly also a
factor; in a city suffering an acute housing shortage, the eviction of families
and demolition of houses is likely to lead to homelessness.
A campaign coordinated by the Chief Architect's Office, the Hanoi
People's Committee, and the Interior Ministry Police has, since the begin-
ning of 1994, resulted in the demolition of over 120 illegal houses built
along the banks of the Red River and West Lake in Hanoi. 12 5 More
recently, in a highly publicized decision, the Prime Minister ordered the
removal of illegal houses built on top of the Red River protection dike in
Hanoi. 126 These demolitions represent only a tiny fraction of the tens of
thousands of illegal buildings in Hanoi and are unlikely to send a suffi-
ciently clear message to diminish the public's enthusiasm for
urban-tradition land use unless they are followed up with consistent
enforcement.
121 Phan Dinh Dai Interview, supra note 115.
122 District people's committee police do not interfere with illegal construction and property sales
unless they are instructed by the responsible authorities, in this case, the city level people's committee of
the Chief Architect's Office. Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70.
123 Ordinance on Residential Housing, art. 12(1)(c) (1991) (restricting construction). As a final
resort, Interior Ministry police may be requested by the responsible people's committee to take criminal
action. PENAL CODE, arts. 180, 214; Law on Land, art. 6 (1993) (restricting land transfer).
124 See generally Vo Van Kiet, supra note 66; Nguyen Tri Dung, Construction Procedures: A
Blueprint for Chaos, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., May 23, 1994, at 16. See also infra part II.D. 1-2.
125 Interview with Ha Van Que, Assistant to the Chief Architect's Office, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Sept.
14, 1994) [hereinafter Ha Van Que Interview]; see, e.g., No Permit No Project, VIETNAM INVESTMENT
REV., Sept. 26, 1994, at I.
126 Decision No. I 58-TTg, Emergency Measures Against Acts of Violation of the Ordinance on
Protection of Dikes in Hanoi (Mar. 16, 1995). See Ha Thang, Dyke Homes Demolished, VIETNAM
INVESTMENT REV., Apr. 24, 1995, at 6 (seven state officials along with the Deputy Chief Architect were
arrested and charged by Interior Ministry Police for allowing structures to be built along the dike; many
were charged with violating with articles 220 and 221 of the Criminal Code).
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D. Authorized Land Use
1. The Formal Administrative Structure
Most administrators, lawyers, and governments are familiar with land
use under formal administrative structures. Such land use differs from other
forms of land use because the relationship between individuals and land is
defined by legislation, which is administered by state officials. DRV
management policy rejected the colonial notion of inalienable private rights
in favor of the socialist view127 that private rights should be restricted for
the public good. 128 This general premise129 continues to underlie post-D6i
M6i legislation to the extent that all private occupiers of land borrow their
rights from the state, and with the exception of agricultural workers, must
pay an annual land tax as "rent." 30  Intended from the outset to be transi-
tional, the useful life of the Land Law 1988 was shortened by constitutional
changes1 3 I that recognized limited private rights.
The Law on Land 1993 crystallized constitutional rights into legisla-
tion by codifying limited private rights to land use, transfer, and inheritance.
It pays particular attention to rights in rural land 32 without going so far as
to allow outright ownership. These developments are important because
security of tenure 133 and the right to transfer are fundamental to private
sector development; they engender confidence, promote investment, and
can assist efficient resource allocation.
127 .The Agrarian Law of 1952 (DRV) authorized the nationalization of land according to the class
category of the owner. See generally E. Moise, Land Reform and Land Errors in North Vietnam, 49 PAC.
AFF. 70, 70-73 (1976). During the period 1954-1987. a quasi-legal system of land management existed in
the North, which was not supported by state authorized legislative instruments. See Nguyen Qui Binh,
supra note 94, at 2.
128 See Nguyen Ngoc Huy & Ta Van Tai, supra note 101, at 485.
129 See generally Nguyen Van Phu, Land Law, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Mar. 16, 1993, at I 8.
130 Ordinance on Residential Housing-Land Tax, arts. 2. 3 (June 29, 1991).
131 VIETNAM CONST. arts. 18, 58 (1992). The unexpected rapid increase in urbanization also
contributed to the legislation's inappropriateness. See Nguyen Van Phu, supra note 129.132 See Chairman Closes Session (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam broadcast, July 14, 1993), in F.B.I.S.
DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 93-134, July 15, 1993, at 53-54: Hoi Vu. NAN DAN, Apr. 20, 1993, at 3 (in
Vietnamese); Dan Pham & Chinh Dinh Tran. Twenty Seven QH Representatives Produced Interpretation
of Land Law at Recent Assembly, NHAN DAN, July 2, 1993, at I (in Vietnamese). It is also possible to own
and lease buildings and improvements. See Ordinance on Residential Housing, arts. 15, 20, 21 (1991).
133. Law on Land, art. I (1993).
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Even though this legislation has created the basis for a normative
legal regime, the right to manage land remains with the government.
1 34
Control is exercised by central-level ministries, in particular, the General
Department of Land Management ("GDLM"). 13 5  Provincial/city and
district-level people's committees have been delegated considerable power
to prepare land records, promulgate zoning and land use regulations, 136 allot
and register land use rights, 137 recover lands, and settle land use disputes in
their localities.138
2. The Nature of Land Use Rights
Although not entitled to full ownership, private companies and
individuals wishing to develop urban land' 39 are entitled to various lesser
interests in land. The highest of these is known as a land use right. Land
use rights are not created equally. Many of their qualities, such as duration
or ability to be transferred or bequeathed, depend upon the intended land
use. Land allotted for domestic housing, for instance, exists for an unspeci-
fied period of time, perhaps in perpetuity, 14 0 provided that the state does not
need to recover it for official purposes. 14 1 A land tenure certificate issued
by a people's committee may be freely transferred, bequeathed, 142 or mort-
gaged, 143 and in most respects behaves much like a Western fee simple
estate. Consequently, land use rights allotted for residential purposes, if not
conveying factual ownership, at least entitle occupiers to a quite extensive
right of disposition. In contrast, the right to land allotted for commercial
134 Article I of the Law on Land gives the right of administration to the state. Article 8 stipulates
that the government (central executive level of the state) shall administer land on behalf of the state.
13 See Decree No. 34-CP On the Functions, Tasks, Power and Organisation of the General
Administration of Land, Office of Government (Apr. 23, 1994).
136 Law on Land, arts. 13-23 (1993); Decree No. 88-CP, On the Administration and Use of Urban
Land, Office of Government (Aug. 17, 1994).
137 Law on Land, art. 33(2) (1993).
138 Id. art. 38.
139 Id. art. 26.
140 Land management authorities will not specify the exact duration of an urban land use right.
However, unless an occupier infringes a provision of the law, or the land is resumed under compulsory
acquisition, there is no legislative impediment to a perpetual duration. See Law on Land, arts. 3, 20, 73, 79
(1993?41 Law on Land, art. 28 (1993).
142 Id. art. 3(2).
143 Id arts. 3(2), 77(2).
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use, such as hotels, is of limited duration 44 and cannot be transferred
without the approval of the Prime Minister and/or provincial/city level
people's committee.14 5
Land use rights are also shaped by the legal status of the occupier.
Except for urban residential and forestry 146 land (where no legal distinction
is made between the state, private corporations, and individu-
als/households), all land rights reflect the legal status of the occupier. For
example, agricultural land is routinely allotted by district level people's
committees to individuals and households, 147 whereas allotments made to
private companies are strictly governed by criteria inserted into their busi-
ness licenses.' 48 Similarly, restrictive rules govern corporate use of urban
land for non-residential purposes. Legal status also governs dispute resolu-
tion. All land disputes involving companies or organizations must be
resolved by city/provincial rather than district people's committees. 149
3. Conceptualizing Authorized Land Use
a. Towards a theory of state managed land
Of the three coexisting and interwoven systems of land control in
Vietnam, only authorized land use is governed by bureaucrats. This is not
to suggest that the state does not attempt to control traditional and
144 The duration of commercial land usage will be determined by people's committees, at the time
of allotment; there are no specific legislative guidelines issued on this point to date. Mai Xuan Yen
Interview, supra note 70; Nguyen Khai Interview, supra note 82.
145 Lawmakers generally regard the transfer of land used for commercial purposes as a sale of a
business. As there is no specific legislation on this point, regulations draw their authority by inference
from Law on Private Enterprises, art. 15 (1990) and Law on Companies, art. 21 (1990) that business
license transfer is not allowed without people's committee approval. If the land use was to change from a
car to a soap factory, for example, a new land use right would need to be issued and the project would have
to conform to local planning and environmental guidelines. See Duong Dang Hue Interview, supra note
99. See also Decree No. 191 -CP Regulations on the Formation, Evaluations and Implementations of Direct
Foreign Investment Projects, Prime Minister, arts. 2, 6, 7 (Dec. 28, 1994) (land is allotted to foreign
investors strictly in accordance with the licensed business objectives of each individual project, and cannot
be acquired for general, unspecified purposes).
146 Decree 2-CP on Enactment of Regulations on the Allocation of Forestry Land to Organisations,
Households and Individuals for Stable and Long Term Use for Forestry Purposes, Office of Government
Regulations (Jan. 15, 1994).
147 Decree No. 64-CP, art. I (1993).
148 Nguyen Nhu Phat Interview, supra note 101; Interview with Nguyen Tien Lap, Chief Legal
Officer, Investconsult, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Sept. 30, 1994). The administrative discretion to so govern the
companies is provided by Circular No. 472 PLDSKT, Ministry of Justice, May 20, 1993, and Law on
Land, arts. 2(I), 3(3), 56 (1993).
149 Law on Land, art. 38 (1993).
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urban-traditional land use. Responsible district level people's committees
have made vigorous efforts to resettle swiddening farmers. Mass organiza-
tions and party branches are also used to exhort urban-traditional land users
to conform with the law. 150 However, unless land falls within the author-
ized system, it escapes the complex administrative structure established by
formal legislation.
In order to better understand authorized land use, it is necessary to
first characterize the kinds of rights that are available to developers. It has
been previously observed that the traditional Vietnamese concept of land
can only imperfectly be described in terms of ownership. Kinship and
village groupings controlled the distribution of land, in a way that did not
give rise to individual property rights along the lines of European land
tenure. 151
Neo-Confucian subordination of the individual to the community 52
was later appropriated to justify socialist collectivization and continues to
underlie much land policy. 153 It is true that the government now favors an
incremental recognition of private land rights.54 But it is also true that
private entitlements are not the focus of the system; they are merely a
mechanism used to personalize control over domestic housing. Unlike
Western land regimes, 155 Vietnamese land law fails to clearly delineate the
boundaries between state and individual rights.
150 Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview, supra note 108.
151 In this regard, traditional land use in Vietnam did not differ greatly from other Southeast Asian
countries. David Lev described land rights in rural, pre-colonial Indonesia in the following terms: "Men
do not generally say they have a right to do something or take something. It is impolite to talk about rights;
it connotes selfishness, absoluteness, belligerency and unwillingness to compromise." David Lev,
Institutions and Legal Culture in Indonesia, in CULTURE AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA 301 (1972). See
MinhQuang Dao, supra note II, at 84, 85-87. See also supra part II.A.
1I2 In rural society, there was no need for a large market as village units were largely self-
sufficient. Each person was a member of a family or village and did not differentiate themselves from the
community in a legal sense. See Tuong Lai, supra note 68, at 10, 13-14. For a detailed account of the
effect of Confucian thought on the individual, see Robert Hegel, An Exploration of the Chinese Literary
Self in EXPRESSION OF SELF IN CHINESE LITERATURE 8-9 (R.E. Hegel & R.C. Hessney eds., 1985).
153 At a widely attended Symposium, Ownership in the Transitional Period, held in Hanoi,
Vietnam by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (Oct. 25-26, 1989). it was concluded that ownership of land
must continue to be more or less socialist in orientation. See Nguyen Thanh Cu, Symposium on Ownership
in the Transitional Period, [1991] I VIETNAM SOC. Sci. 89, 92.
154 See Gillespie, supra note 8, at 325, 338-41.
155 See generally Cotterrell, supra note 25, at 81-98; cf E. Mensch, The History of Mainstream
Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 18, 23-36 (David Cairys ed., 1982).
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Developing this further, the conventional Western 56 construction of
land rights as a bundle of entitlements enjoyed over land, dissolves in the
face of state management in Vietnam. Vietnamese land entitlements
emerge from a balancing process, where the state weighs individual needs
against those of society. The broad administrative discretion delegated to
people's committees 157 ensures that property rights remain blurred. This is
particularly noticeable where land is allotted for commercial, rather than
residential purposes. In short, the boundaries between newly emerging
p rivate property rights and public power are protean and fragile.
b. Social utility of land
Another dimension to the problem arises from the ongoing struggle
between the public interest, as it is interpreted by the state, and individual
rights. In Vietnam, factors such as the demand for land, the nature of the
terrain, urban character, social utility, and above all else, the efficiency of
exploitation, are evaluated by people's committees during the allotment
process.15 8 Put another way, private land rights exist by virtue of an admin-
istrative discretion which looks beyond individual needs to broader
community interests. For example, an allotment may be taken back by the
state not only where tenure expires or land is abandoned, but also where
land is used for a purpose other than that for which it was allotted, the land
area exceeds the stipulated area for each household,159 or where duties
contained in a Land Tenure Certificate or business permit are not
followed. 160 These latter provisions in Particular go well beyond the powers
usually vested in Western land management officials. 16 1
156 This is not to suggest that rights in land in Western jurisdictions are absolute. Like Vietnam,
Western nations reserve the power to compulsorily acquire or otherwise diminish private rights in land in
the national interest, subject to a guarantee of compensation. The distinction is one of purpose. In the
West, rights are created to delineate the boundaries between state and private interests, whereas in
Vietnam, land rights are generated as mechanisms to facilitate state management of land.
157 See Law on Land, art. I (1993). See also Gillespie, supra note 8, at 338-43, 350-56.
158 See Decree No. 64-CP, art. 5(3) (1993).
159 Decree No. 64-CP, art. 13 (1993).
160 Law on Land, art. 26 (1993). For maximum residential areas, see Law on Land, art. 54 (1993)
(generally, the amount of land allocated for residential purposes in rural areas is not to exceed 400 square
meters).
161 Western land management officials are typically invested with town planning powers, and may
determine land use within designated areas, but are not usually permitted to insert "covenants" setting out
rights and duties in respect of individual allotments.
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One of the principal aims of the Law on Land 1993 is to enhance
rural productivity, thereby alleviating poverty and increasing tax revenue. 162
The state consequently highly values farming and commercial
development 63 and fosters efficient exploitation of resources by closely
supervising this type of land use. Take, for example, the vigorous campaign
mounted by people's committees, mass organizations, and the party to
reform inefficient swiddening. The high social utility attached to efficient
farming techniques overrides local ethnic interests; farming land is strictly
allotted and monitored by the state. The duration of an allotment coincides
with the minimum time required to maximize production' 64 and rights are
forfeited where land lies idle for longer than twelve consecutive months. 165
Rice land is allocated for seven years for example, plantation and forestry
land for forty and sixty years respectively. 166
Commercial land also enjoys a high social utility and it is accordingly
allocated on a case-by-case basis reflecting the specific needs of the locality
and the particular industry. A textile factory may receive a twenty year
allotment, whereas a tourist development may require forty to fifty years to
recoup investment and earn an appropriate return on capital. 167 Private
162 See Nguyen Tri Dung, New Class of Rural Poor Tests the Limits of Reform, VIETNAM
INVESTMENT REV., June 27, 1994, at 8; Government of Western Australia and The Institute of Land
Management Australia, Feasibility Study On Vietnam Land Management System, Report 2, 6-9 (July
1993) (unpublished report) [hereinafter Feasibility Study].
163 See Do Muoi Delivers Political Report (pt. I), (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam broadcast, Jan. 20,
1994), in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-014, Jan. 21, 1994, at 55-58; Vo NHAN TRI, supra note 37, ch.
4 (describing agriculture, industry and handicrafts in the 1986-90 economic renovation).
164 See Decree No. 64-CP, art. 3 (1993) (specifying principles according to which land is
allocated).
165 Law on Land, art. 26(3) (1993).
166 Cf Regulations on Allocation of Land to Households and Individuals for Stable and Long Term
Use for the Purpose of Agricultural Production (issued with Decree 64-CP), Sept. 27, 1993, art. 4
(specifying allocation for certain uses and calculations for other allocations). The actual time limits are not
published; they remain at the discretion of local officials. Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70. It
should be noted that a maximum limit is also placed upon the surface area that can be allotted.
167 All applications for commercial development of land must be accompanied by a pre-feasibility
statement that sets out projected profits and losses for the first five years of production. These figures are
then used by the relevant people's committee (in the case of small projects) and the Office of Government
(for large projects) to calculate the time required to recoup investment. These authorities will then grant
additional years according to a predetermined formula to allow the investor to generate profit. This figure
is often determined by negotiation and is influenced by the social utility of the development. See, e.g.,
Instruction B, Guidance on Instructions for Construction Land Use Licences 601/KTS-TH, Chief
Architect's Office, Hanoi People's Comm. (June II, 1993). Legislation conveys administrative discretion,
but within those wide parameters, bureaucrats determine land use duration and allotment criteria. Mai
Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70.
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rights in land 168 are granted to ensure the following factors:
* the state maintains highest authority over land;
" land is developed in accordance with the market system and
managed by the state;
" land is utilized in a rational manner in order to create convenient
conditions for economic development and goods production;
* people are given a chance to do what they do best;
* the reorganization of the labor force can commence;
* land speculation may be stopped;
* legitimate rights and interests of land users can be protected; and
* production is stable and farmers can have land for production.169
Thus, the concept of social utility as a basis for land allocation encompasses
a broad range of criteria aimed at achieving specific state goals.
c. Land rights and collective ownership
The relationship between legislation and the status of individuals in
Vietnamese society warrants closer examination, as it helps to explain state
management of land. As previously discussed, land laws reflect an underly-
ing belief that the good of society in general outweighs individual interests.
This lack of an ideological commitment to the individual comes as much
from neo-Confucian/Vietnamese village tradition 170 as from Marxism. 17 1
Both doctrines suggest that individuals hold property subject to the
performance of duties, not a few of them public. Unlike China, the socialist
revolution in Vietnam did not radically reassess prevailing neo-Confucian
norms. 172 And the Western notion of individual rights, in legal theory being
equal to state rights, has never found many adherents in Vietnam. Laws are
seen as statements about duties that must be obeyed, and it is believed that
168 Law on Land, arts. 73-78 (1993).
169 Mai Xuan Yen, Land Price Policy (Sept. 15, 1994) (unpublished paper, presented at Conference
on the Land System in Vietnam, Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry).
170 See Tuong Lai, supra note 68, at 10, 12; Do Thai Dong, supra note 10, at 77, 80-86; Jamieson,
supra note 14, at 217-18, 283; Hegel, supra note 152, at 8-9.
171 Individual and Collective, in 4 MARXISM, COMMUNISM IN WESTERN SOCIETY 235-37 (C.D.
Kemig ed., 1972).
172 see Tuong Lai, supra note 68, at 10, 12.
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if only people were aware of their duties the legal system and society would
function harmoniously. 173
The interaction between rights-based land laws and a society largely
governed by conventions, habits, mores, and party ideology is complex and
not particularly well understood. 174 Field researchers 175 are concerned
about the consequences of introducing Western law, based upon atomistic
individuality, into a culture where even in comparatively Westernized urban
areas a person's identity tends to be fused with that of the family.
The problem manifests itself where the law requires people's commit-
tees to allocate land use rights to individuals 176 or households. 177 Where
land is granted to a household, the Certificate of Land Tenure is signed by
the principal income provider-usually the oldest male. Despite research'
78
which suggests that in some localities thirty to forty percent of households
are supported by women, men are routinely granted legal rights to lease and
mortgage land use rights in preference to women.
Allotment criteria tend to favor men. In rural areas, land distribution
is based not only on the size of a household, but also on their capacity to
farm efficiently. 179 Preference is also given to those without permanent
173 Phan Huu Chi Interview, supra note 76; Interview with Nguyen Tran Bat, President
Investconsult, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Jan. 20, 1994 and June 26, 1994) [hereinafter Nguyen Tran Bat
Interview]. This view is similar to the injunction of Mencius that "if each man would love his parents and
show due respect to his elders, the whole land would enjoy tranquillity." PHILIP CHEN, LAW AND JUSTICE:
THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN CHINA 32 (1973).
174 See Adam Fforde, Law and Socialist Agricultural Development in Vietnam: The Statute for
Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. 10 REV. SOCIALIST L. 315, 315-19. This is a subject that has not been
studied in great detail in Vietnam, but research elsewhere in Southeast Asia suggests that predictions based
on cultural assumptions often prove to be wrong. See Stivens Maila, The Fate of Women's Land Rights:
Gender, Matriliny and Capitalism in Remban, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia, in WOMEN, WORK AND
IDEOLOGY IN THE THIRD WORLD 3-9, 28-29 (Helen Atshar ed., 1985).
175 For example, research conducted by Dr. Esta Ungar of the University of Western Australia, as
the official historian to the UNDP Feasibility Study on Vietnam Land Management System, suggests that
there is little acceptance of the notion that individuals are the locus of rights. UNDP - Working Paper
Series VIE/91/004. A study of Vietnamese literature published between the 1930s and the socialist period
suggests that only a small urban Western educated elite asserted their sense of self. See Cong Huyen Ton,
The Role of French Romanticism in the New Poetry Movement, in BORROWINGS AND ADAPTATIONS IN
VIETNAMESE CULTURE 52-62 (Truong Buu Lam ed.. 1987).
176 Law on Land, arts. 3, 20 (1993): Decree No. 64-CP, arts. 1, 3, 5(3) (1993).
177 The term "household" is not defined in the Law on Land (1993),'but the population census of
1989 included in this category all people with marriage or blood relationships, or who were being brought
up by a family and shared a common fund of expenses and receipts. Households are issued a registration
document which lists the number of members, heads of households, and relationship between members.
This document has legal consequences as it defines the state's relationship to those listed as members. See
Le Thi, Women. Marriage, Family and Gender Equality, [1993] 2 VIETNAM SOC. ScI. 21, 22.
178 See Tran Thi Van Anh, supra note 79, at 8-9.
179 See Decree 64-CP, art. 3 (1993).
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resident status, the off-spring of local party cadre, state officials, or cadre
and state officials on sick leave or early retirement.18 0 In contrast, alloca-
tion in urban areas is theoretically determined according to the merit of
business and/or building plans in addition to family needs.' 8 1  These
commercial criteria once again describe aspects of social activity where
women do not compete on an equal basis with men. 182
Community customs reserve a place for women as organizers of the
household and workers of land, 183 providing some measure of security over
land. These admittedly imperfect customary rights 184 may erode now that
land allotment is increasingly regulated by objective laws that favor house-
hold decision makers and property controllers, 8 5 who are usually male.
Customary practices are unlikely to change quickly, but it is plausible that
eventually rights-based law will be internalized and integrated into custom-
ary norms. The status of women in the interim may be partially protected,
or even enhanced, by the enactment of equal opportunity laws or appropri-
ate amendments to the Marriage and Family Law. 186 Nevertheless, a
danger remains that customary practices will weaken before state mandated
safeguards are enacted, internalized, and obeyed. 187
180 id. arts. 7-8.
181 See Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70; Nguyen Khai Interview, supra note 82.
182 See Bui Thi Kim Quy, Jobs for Women in Relation to Social Development and Family
Happiness, [1993] 3 VIETNAM SOC. Sci. 94, 96-98; Quan Doi, Directive of the Central Committee
Secretariat on Some Problems Concerning Women Cadre-Related Work in the New Situation, in NHAN
DAN, May 20, 1994, at 1-4 (in Vietnamese).
183 Le Thi, supra note 177, at 30-33.
184 See JAMIESON, supra note 14, at 18-19.
185 See JAMIESON, supra note 14, at 18-19.
186 Eliminating discrimination is not as simple as passing legislation. In the debate over the
effectiveness of legislation as a tool of social change, the crudely instrumentalist view that legal change
translates directly into social change has been discarded. See. e.g., L. Lustgarten, Racial Inequality and the
Limits of Law, 49 MOD. L. REV. 68 (1986). The effect of law on actual practices is more correctly seen as
a complex and unpredictable inter reaction. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that law can change
people's values. One explanation for this phenomenon is that when people regard their beliefs and values
as a lost cause, forbidden by law, they may abandon them in favor of state-sponsored rules. See William
M. Evan, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 554-62 (William M. Evan
ed., 1980); SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 72, at 39-5 1.
187 As a general principle, formal rules tend to be most persuasive where they act on rational
commercial decisions such as property ownership, and least effective in modifying moral or aesthetic
values.- The literature in this area is extensive. See, e.g., Yehezkel Dror, Law and Social Change, 33
TULANE L. REv. 749 (1959); J. Morison, How to Change Things with Rules, in LAW, SOCIETY AND
CHANGE 8-9 (S. Livingston & J. Morison eds.. 1990).
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d Instrumental problems with land iaw
The Law on Land 1993 is basically a set of broad hortative principles;
it fails to provide detailed definitions, guidelines, or procedures. This
would not matter if these concepts already existed in commercial practice,
but as previously mentioned, Vietnam did not develop an indigenous rights-
based land regime. 188 Compounding the problem, lawmakers have been
slow to enact subordinate legislation that clearly defines allotment proce-
dures, transfers, financing, and occupation rights. As Vietnam is rapidly
changing from state management to a market-oriented economy, law-
makers cautiously identify social trends before committing themselves to
legislation that might be unnecessarily restrictive or redundant. 189 In the
interim, local authorities exercise a broad administrative discretion that is
flexible enough to respond to emerging commercial and social practices, but
is at the same time sufficiently authoritative to ensure that land use allot-
ments, transfers, financing, and occupation rights conform to state policy.
For example, it has already been noted that people's committees are
required to take into account a number of broad criteria when allotting resi-
dential land. These factors include the social utility of the proposed land
use in addition to personal needs such as the size of the household and
whether it includes disabled veterans or the aged. 190 Within these wide
parameters, people's committees are free to make decisions on unrelated
policy factors governing the market value of real estate in the area, and the
commercial need for goods or services, for example. 19 1
Now that the command economy has been virtually dismantled while
state institutions remain insufficiently developed to enable economic levers,
such as taxation and interest rates, to operate efficiently, 192 the state has
188 See supra part II.A.
189 Phan Huu Chi Interview, supra note 76; Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70; Interview
with Phung Van Nghe, Planning Officer, General Department of Land Management, in Hanoi, Vietnam
(Jan. 28, 1994).
190 Law on Land, arts. 19, 20, 33, 54, 57, 59 (1993); Decree 64-CP, arts. 6-9 (1993); Mai Xuan Yen
Interview, supra note 70, Nguyen Khai Interview, supra note 82.
191 Phan Huu Chi Interview, supra note 76; Nguyen Tran Bat Interview, supra note 173.
192 The Government has only recently started to raise revenue through the Ordinance on Land and
Housing Tax (1992). A transfer tax of 8% (5% paid by transferor and 3% by transferee) is imposed by the
Ordinance on Land Transfer Tax (1993). In order to dampen land speculation, a punitive 30/ rate, in
addition to the maximum rate of tax on personal irregular income, Circular No. 29, Ministry of Finance
(1993) applies where capital gain from a sale exceeds 50 million dong or is derived from speculation.
Since the tax was first collected on June I, 1993, recorded land transactions have diminished by over 50%
in Ho Chi Minh City. Whether this effect has been caused by property prices or high taxes is unclear. See
Land Market Slows, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., July 19, 1993. at 17. See generally Raymond Mallon,
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tended to use administrative discretion as a micro-economic control.
Administrative discretion has certain advantages over legislation. For
example, discretion is easily guided to take into account nuances of state
policy and rapidly changing social norms. In contrast, legislation is
comparatively inflexible and frequent amendments and re-enactments may
provide an unwanted record of state ineptitude and vacillation.
Furthermore, the regional variations between the north-south, highland-
lowland divide will militate against the use of general comprehensive
national legislation, but administrative discretion decentralizes and localizes
national laws. By providing the state with a means of intricately controlling
land dealings,193 discretion fills the regulatory vacuum that would otherwise
be occupied by detailed normative legislation.194
It is quite possible that an extensive reliance on administrative guid-
ance will remain an enduring feature of Vietnam's legal system. It cannot
have escaped the notice of policymakers that most of Vietnam's economi-
cally successful neighbors use administrative guidance to tilt their legal
systems in favor of state sponsored economic and social goals, usually at
the expense of generalized normative law. 95 Notwithstanding rhetoric to
the contrary, 196 little is being done to diminish administrative control over
urban development and Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet's plea for "a complete
change from bureaucratic management to running the nation by law"
remains unfulfilled.197
Many policymakers have now concluded that reform of substantive
law cannot on its own bring order to urban development, especially because
the Law on Land 1993 has so far been particularly unsuccessful in achieving
this end. It is true that law-based solutions have not prospered because the
Vietnam: Image and Reality, in REVITALIZING SOCIALIST ENTERPRISE: A RACE AGAINST TIME 207-08
(John Heath ed., 1993).
193 See Gillespie, supra note 8, at 362-63.
194 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see supra part IlI.C. l-2.
195 See Vu Tuan Anh, Changes and Perspectives of Development, in VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC
REFORM: RESULTS AND PROBLEMS 204-10 (Vu Tuan Anh ed., 1994). See generally D. Douglas, The
Developmental State and the Newly Industrialised Economies of Asia, 26 ENV'T & PLANNING 543, 545-48
(1994); WORLD BANK RESEARCH REPORT, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY 353-61 (1993); A. CHOWDHURY & I. ISLAM, THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALISING ECONOMIES OF EAST
ASIA, ch. 5 (1993).
196 See Phan Van Khai, Deputy Prime Minister, Speech at Mid Term Conference of the Ho Chi
Minh City Fifth Party Committee, SAIGON GIAI PHONG, Mar. 31, 1994, at 2-3. There is discussion at the
party level about perceived inefficiencies in the delegation process. See Le Huu Nghia, Maintain Political
Stability and Renovate the Political System. SAIGON GIAI PHONG, Mar. 12, 1994, at 2-3.
197 See PM Speaks, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., June 20, 1992, at 5.
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full complement of subordinate legislation has yet to be enacted. 198 But this
is only part of the problem; the land bureaucracy is also a contributing
factor.
IV. BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL OF LAND USE
A. The Nature of the Bureaucracy
One of the most puzzling questions about land laws in Vietnam is
how seriously should they be taken. Although there is an increasingly
sophisticated body of formal legislation, 199 often drafted with Western legal
assistance, little has been done to retrain an administration imbued with
socialist legal principles.200 Many commentators have observed that legis-
lation is often treated by the bureaucracy as an inconvenient adjunct to the
central business of state management of land,20 1 and frequent calls 202 for the
nation to be ruled by law only serve to draw attention to the fact that this
broad social goal has manifestly not been achieved. In this legal environ-
ment, it is hardly surprising that legal rules seldom seem to work as
intended.
1. Bureaucratic Responsibilities as Defined by Law
The 1992 Constitution confers administrative responsibilities upon
central-level ministries, 203 people's committes, 204 legislative administra-
198 Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70. Of the eighty-nine articles of the Law on Land (1993),
less than twenty have been elucidated through subordinate legislation.
199 Such legislation includes, for example, Law on Land (1993), Ordinance on Residential Housing
(1991), Ordinance on Construction (1991), and Regulations on Construction Management and
Conservation of the Old Quarter of Hanoi, Hanoi Municipal People's Comm. (Aug. 30, 1993) (city
people's committee regulations).
200 See Mark Sidel, Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex Transition from Legal Scholarship and
Training, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 221, 255-58 (1993) (there is a concurrence of opinion in Vietnam that
more training is necessary).
201 See Yen Hung, Kiet Blasts Bureaucrats, Orders Shake-Up for 1995, VIETNAM INVESTMENT
REV., Jan. 16, 1995, at 5. See generally Government Circular No. 96/BT, Guiding the Implementation of
Government Resolution No. 38/CP on Initial Reform of Administrative Procedures in the Solution of
Citizen and Organization Affairs (May 31, 1994); Sachs, supra note 16, at 14; Assembly Issues
Anticorruption Resolution, (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam broadcast) (Ninth National Assembly, Fourth
Session, Hanoi, Dec. 30, 1993), in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-077, Jan. 11, 1994, at 54.
202 See Ngo Ba Thanh, supra note 24; at 108-15; Nguyen Duy Quy, On the Problem of Building a
Juridical State in Our Country, [ 1992] 3 VIETNAM SOC. SCI. 10, 13-15.
203 VIETNAM CONST. arts. 109, 112, 114 (1992).
204 Id. arts. 123, 124.
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tors, 2 0 5  judicial administrators, 206  but not the CPV207 or mass
organizations. 208 Administrative functions are not as a rule separated from
legislative or even judicial roles. People's committees, for example, not
only administer 209 but also legislate, 2I0 police, 2 11 and adjudicate 2 12 land use.
The state definition of officials provides some clarity by focusing
upon the exercise of power rather than designated functions. A person in an
official position is "entrusted by appointment, through election, by contract
or through other arrangements, with or without payment of a salary, while
performing the duties of a particular public office and exercising legitimate
powers while performing those duties. '2 13 Accordingly, directors of state
owned enterprises are state officials because they exercise state power to
carry out policy, but Fatherland Front organizations are excluded, because
they are not part of the administrative corpus of the state,2 14 tven though
their officials discharge state policy and are often paid at public service
races.215
2. Bureaucratic Responsibilities as Perceived by the Ruling Elite
The Vietnamese bureaucracy is characterized by the existence of an
often "chaotic overlap" 216 between party and government functions;
205 Id. arts. 84 (National Assembly), 103 (President), 118 (People's Councils).
206 Id arts. 134, 137.
207 Although the CPV is given a policy making function, it is not part of the state organization.
VIETNAM CONST. art. 4 (1992).
208 The Fatherland Front is described as the political base of the administration, so although it has
administrative functions, according to the Constitution it is not part of the state. VIETNAM CONST. art. 9
(1992); Orientations for the Building and Perfection of the Vietnam Socialist Republic State, supra note 98,
at 5-6.
209 Law on Land, art. 8 (1993).
210 Id. art. 13.
211 Id art. 37.
212 Id art. 38.
213 PENAL CODE, art. 219 (1986) (amended 1992).
214 Interview with Phan Duc Binh, Director, Legal Department, Ministry of Labor, in Hanoi,
Vietnam (Sept. 8, 1994). The Office of Government is currently drafting state employee regulations that
will contain a legal definition of a bureaucrat.
215 Id. For an interesting comparison, see generally, E. Epstein, Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao
China, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 19, 25-28 (Pittman B. Potter ed., 1994)
(discussing the role of bureaucracy in China in executing the orders of the party, but not necessarily the
state).
216 THAI QUANG TRUNG, COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND FACTIONALISM 82 (1985) (citing LA
BUREAUCRATIC AU VIETNAM (Boudarel et al. eds., 1993)). See David Mart, Walking on One or Two Legs
in Contemporary Vietnam, in RESEARCHING THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC REFORMS: 1978-1986, at 22, 28-
20 (Adam Fforde ed., 1995).
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because the CPV monopolizes political power 217 descriptions of the
bureaucracy must be interwoven with the political structure. In commenting
upon the bureaucracy, Vo Chi Cong, then President, said:
Nevertheless, we must not confuse the function of party organ-
isations and that of the state apparati. Party organizations are
set up in accordance with the principles set out in the party
statutes, while state apparati are organised to carry out tasks
and duties stipulated by the Constitution and law.
2
"8
In theory at least, the ruling elite defines the bureaucracy in instrumental
terms as an organ that implements the constitution and law. Yet in contrast
to the semblance of impartiality and respect for a community's political
values required of the Western bureaucracy, CPV doctrine has highly poli-
ticized all state organs, 2 19 creating an undifferentiated bureaucracy.
Political influence is made possible in Vietnam by the extraordinary lengths
to which the party goes to ensure that its members occupy influential posi-
tions in state organizations under the nomenclatura system.220 The blurred
distinction between the judicial, executive, and legislative (National
Assembly) branches of government also helps to maintain party control.221
And finally, although state administration is hierarchical and centralist,
entrenched localism ensures that cooperation between the central and
217 See Carlyle Thayer. Renovation and Vietnamese Society: The Changing Roles of Government
and Administration, in DOi Moi: VIETNAM'S RENOVATION POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 21, 21-23 (Dean
Forbes et al. eds., 1991); B. Womack. The Party and the People: Revolutionary and Post-revolutionary
PoPlics in China and Vietnam, WORLD POLITICS, July 1987, at 479-507.
218 Vo Chi Cong Discusses New Constitution (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam broadcast, Jan. 2, 1992), in
F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 92-007, Jan. 10, 1992, at 66.
219 See Peter Nguyen Van Hai, Recent Public Service Reform in Vietnam, in INFRASTRUCTURAL
DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL CHANGE IN VIETNAM 129, 133-34 (Graham Hassall & Truong Truong eds.,
1994).
220 The "nomenclatura" system establishes a list of appointments by the CPV which ensures that
key legislative, executive, and judicial posts are occupied by party members. It forms an informal link
between party and state. See Russell Heng Hiang Khng, The 1992 Revised Constitution of Vietnam, 14
CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 221-25 (1992); Thayer, supra note 52, at 120-22. Cf. F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE,
RUSSIAN LAW: THE END OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF LAW 117-21 (1993).
221 The judiciary and executive are constitutionally answerable to the National Assembly, VIETNAM
CONST. arts. 109, 135 (1992), and "[t]he party directs the National Assembly elections adequately in order
to choose highly qualified and competent deputies to represent the people's will and aspirations as well as
the common interests of the nation as a whole." Vu Oanh, supra note 51, at 3 (in Vietnamese). See
Russell Heng Hiang Khng, supra note 220; at 221-25.
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provincial levels remains problematic, 222 often distorting the bureaucratic
chain of command.
Administrative reform has been given a high priority and it is clear
that the CPV regards bureaucratic miscreance as a direct threat to party
authority. 223 But calls for a law-based governance will remain a pious hope
as long as influential members of the party such as Secretary General Do
Muoi believe that "[l]aw cannot have precedence over actual economic and
intellectual conditions of a given people." 224 For many in the party the law
is not an immutable authority to be obeyed absolutely, but rather an impor-
tant mechanism for the implementation of CPV policy. In Vietnam, the
bureaucracy only derives a mechanical or ceremonial validity from legisla-
tion and the constitution. Real authority comes from realizing CPV
policy, 225 and this is determined by the bureaucracy's success in implement-
ing national planning goals, such as the development of urban areas, export
processing zones, or tourist resorts.
222 See M. Beresford, Interpretation of the Vietnamese Economic Reforms 1979-85, in
RESEARCHING THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC REFORMS: 1979-86, at I, 11-13 (Australia-Vietnam Research
Project Monograph Series 1, Jan. 1995). It should be noted that the fifth installment of the "basic content"
of the Hanoi January 20-25 Mid-Term Party National Conference Resolution called for state authorities to
regulate their duties regardless of whether they were central or local. Further on Hanoi Midterm Congress
Resolution, in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-070, Apr. 12, 1994. at 74 (translating from Vietnamese
text in SAIGON GIAI PHONG, Mar. 19, 1994, at 2).
223 See Bui Thien Ngo Reports to National Assembly Dec. 8, 1993 (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam
broadcast), in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 93-238, Dec. 14. 1993, at 70-71; Vo Van Kiet, supra note 66,
at 65, 66. "Corruption, ineptitude, a poor sense of organization and discipline, and bureaucratism among
not an inconsiderable number of cadres in many state agencies and organizations at various sectors and
echelons, both in the administrative and trading sectors, are negating many policies. They are hampering
and undermining the renovation, and reducing the people's confidence. They are a challenge to the party
leadership and the state management." Id. The Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet in a recent directive warned
Hanoi People's Committee officials to "ensure that construction in the city be carried out in strict
observance of the capital's development Master Plan .... The most important task is to maintain order and
the observance of laws and regulations. City authorities should adopt measures to stop at once all
construction activities being carried out illegally or without permits." Nguyen Tri Dung, supra note 107.
Accord Phan Huu Chi Interview; supra note 76. Powerful people's committee chairmen may, at times, act
independent of central power. Hoang Phuoc Hiep et al., An Introduction to the Vietnamese Legal System
86-87 (Apr. 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
224 Party Leader Stresses Importance of Reforming Political System, VIETNAM NEWS, Mar. 25,
1992, at 2. See also John Gillespie, Australian Legal Assistance to Vietnam: How to Cook the Small Fish,
20 INT'L L. NEWS, Sept. 1993, at 7, 9.
225 See New Orientation in the Industrialisation Policy of Vietnam, 3 KINH TE CHAu A THAI BINH
DUONG [ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW], Sept. 1994, at 6 (English translation of the resolution of the
Seventh Session of the CPV outlining industrialization policy); Bui Tat Thang, Industrialisation Under the
Economic Renovation in Vietnam, 2 KINH TE CHAU A THAI BINH DUONG [ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC
REVIEW], June 1994, at 17-20.
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B. The Institutional Framework of Land Management
1. Central Control
State officials have a constitutional responsibility to manage land,226
and a three-tiered administrative structure at each level of government
227
has been created for this purpose. The General Department of Land
Management ("GDLM") at the central level is invested with power to
formulate policy and enact rules that guide local authorities in the allotment,
transfer, encumbrance, and registration of land use rights.228  Land
management departments allocate land, control transfers of land, and
resolve disputes concerning organizations. 229 They also guide district and
sub-district (phuong) people's committees in all other cases. 230
A similar organizational structure governs planning and construction.
The Institute of Urban and Regional Planning, attached to the Ministry of
Construction at the central level, sets broad planning guidelines (master
plans) which are then implemented by chief architect's offices established
in the major cities. Provinces have an equivalent planning institute and
building department. 2 31 By virtue of their personal appointment by the
Prime Minister, chief architects are accorded the status of vice-chairmen but
otherwise enjoy a quasi-independent position within the hierarchy of city-
level people's committees. 232 As such, their loyalty is divided between the
Institute of Urban and Regional Planning of the Ministry of Construction,
the Prime Minister, and the local government. Until regulations are passed
226 VIETNAM CONST. art. 18 (1992).
227 At the central level, three bodies are responsible for establishing broad legislative principles that
guide the detailed administration of development at the city level. The General Department of Land
Management oversees the allocation of land use rights, and the Ministry of Construction supervises the
Ordinance on Construction (1991) and associated subordinate legislation. Meanwhile, under the auspices
of the Ministry of Construction, the Institute for Urban and Regional Planning ("IURP") guides the
drafting of the Master Plans for Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and other urban centers. The Ministry of
Communications and Transport in conjunction with the Ministry of Construction provide professional
guidance to Urban Public Works Services attached to city level people's committees. See NGUYEN THANH
BINH & PHAN MANH CHINH, PLANNING ORIENTATION AND INVESTMENT PROJECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENHANCEMENT OF HANOI CITY 10-1 (1994).
228 Law on Land, arts. 23, 24, 29, 31 (1993); Decree No. 34-CP, Functions, Tasks, Powers and
Organisation of the General Administration of Land, art. 5 (1994).
229 Law on Land, arts. 23, 24, 29, 31 (1993).
230 Law on Land, arts. 24, 31, 33 (1993).
231 Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview, supra note 108.
232 Ha Van Que Interview, supra note 125. The appointment is made on the recommendation of
the Minister for Construction. In fact, the current Chief Architect of Hanoi, Nguyen Lan, is a former
department director from within the Ministry of Construction ("MOC").
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by the central government that authoritatively delineate the role of chief
architects, the powers and responsibilities exercised by these bodies will
continue to overlap with those of the Institute of Urban and Regional
Planning and to a lesser extent, the city-level people's committees.
The recently enacted Regulation on the Management of Investment
and Construction233 divides construction projects into three categories, so-
called groups A, B, and C. Central control is maintained over investment
projects in group A, while ministers, the heads of ministerial-level agencies,
and the chairman of people's committees may approve construction in the
other categories. The powers and functions of chief architects await legis-
lative elucidation. It is clear though that these bodies no longer have the
power to approve major projects, while their unchecked discretion over
smaller projects remains intact. 234
2. Local and Central Control
Dual lines of authority create divided loyalties. Vertical lines of
authority control central land management working at the provincial/city
level; these central land management officials are also controlled horizon-
tally by people's committees.235 Central government land management
officials are recruited, promoted, managed, and accommodated by, as well
as directly responsible to, people's committees. Although constitutionally
superior,236 central programs initiated by the GDLM, the Institute of Urban
and Regional Planning, and the MOC may be distorted beyond recognition
or only partially implemented, particularly where there is conflict with local
interests. 237
The success of central control over local land management depends,
among other factors, upon the objectives and clarity of ministerial instruc-
tions. For example, the provincial/city and district officials are guided by
233 Issued together with Decree No. 177-CP of the Government Oct. 20, 1994 (see arts. 5, 6 and
app. (Classification of Investment Projects)).
234 Phan Dinh Dai Interview, supra note 115. See. e.g., Decision No. 22 BXD-QLXD, Regulations
on Construction Activities (Jan. 26, 1993); Circular on Management of Construction Projects with Foreign
Capital Jan. 26, 1993).
M35 Phan Huu Chi Interview, "supra note 76. See generally I. Mayo-Smith et al., Report of the
Public Administration Diagnostic Mission: UNDP Hanoi, 8-10, 38-39, 53 (Apr. 1992) (unpublished).
236 VIETNAM CONST. arts. 109, 112, 116(1992).
237 Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70.
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detailed provisions issued by the government 238 that prescribe permitted
survey tolerances and cadastral mapping methodologies. There is reported
to be a high level of adherence to these provisions.239 All levels of govern-
ment agree with the need for accurate allotment, and because the legislation
is drafted in prescriptive and technical language, it is clear and easy to
understand. Less agreeable central-level instructions may be met with
bureaucratic procrastination, intransigence, and sabotage240 at the local
level. Greater concentration of power in the hands of ministries is often
seen as a means of overcoming local autarky. 24 1 But this simplistic solution
does not adequately address competing family, party, and business
loyalties.242
Prescriptive control from the central level is still unusual. More
commonly, local authorities are delegated a broad authority to manage most
aspects of land use.243 Valuable urban and rural allotments are directly
controlled by the Prime Minister with less important land under the author-
ity of provincial/city-level people's committees; all other land is governed
at the district level, subject to provincial/city direction. 244 The Fatherland
238 See, e.g., Decree No. 119-CP, Promulgating the Regulation on the Management and Use of the
Administrative Boundary Dossiers, Maps and Marker Posts of Various Levels (Sept. 17, 1994).
239 Browne, supra note 94, at 14-15.
240 Nguyen Tran Bat Interview, supra note 173; Mai Xuan Yen. supra note 169.
241 See Vu Oanh, supra note 51. There is also dissatisfaction with the degree of corruption at the
municipal level.
242 See Beresford, supra note 222, at I 1-13. For a revealing account of the difficulties facing
central enforcement over local bureaucracies, compare Kevin O'Brien, Implementing Political Reform in
China's Villages, 32 AUSTL. J. CHINESE AFF. 33, 41-50 (July 1994).
243 Law on Land, art. 8 (1993). Article 13 stipulates that state administration of land shall include:
(I) investigation, survey, measurement, assessment and classification of land, and drawing
of maps;
(2) zoning of land and planning for its use;
(3) promulgation of rules and regulations for land administration and use, and
organisation of the implementation of these rules and regulations;
(4) allocation, rental and recovery of land:
(5) land registration, establishing and maintaining land registers, management of land use
contracts, recording land statistics and inventories of land, and granting certificates of
the right to use land;
(6) inspection to ensure compliance with rules and regulations on land administration and
land use;
(7) resolution of land disputes and complaints, and denouncement of breaches of
provisions on land administration and land use.
Id. art. 13.
244 Mai Xuan Yen, supra note 169. It should be noted that projects of national importance are
directly controlled by the Prime Minister. See Decree No. 191-CP, Promulgating the Regulations on the
Formation, Evaluation and Implementation of Direct Foreign Investment Projects, arts. 6, 7, 10 (Dec. 28,
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Front and its member organizations, other social organizations, the people's
armed forces, and citizens are encouraged to support state officials in the
management of land.24 5
The inter-relationship between the central and local levels of govern-
ment is illustrated by the planning process for the Ancient Quarter of
Hanoi.246 Under the Master Plan Hanoi 2010,247 the NIURP only sets
broad planning priorities; more detailed schemes for their respective locali-
ties are drafted by district-level people's committees under the guidance of
the Chief Architect's Office. 248 For example, the Hoan Kiem District
People's Committee, with assistance from the NIURP, drafted a compre-
hensive planning scheme for the thirty-six commercial streets (36 Pho
Phuong) of the ancient quarter which has been approved by the Chief
Architect, Hanoi People's Committee, while more general regulations on
construction management have been approved by the Prime Minister.249
Due to domestic and international media attention and to review by the
broadly constituted Council for the Restitution of Old Hanoi,250 it is most
1994); Decree No. 177-CP on Regulations on the Management of Investment and Construction, Govt., art.
6, app. (1994).
245 Law on Land, art. 10(1993).
246 Overall responsibility for coordinating regional planning resides with the NIURP. Nguyen
Ngoc Khoi Interview, supra note 108. At the instigation of NIURP, the drafting of the Master Plan started
with the Science and Technology Board. Preliminary plans were then sent to the Hanoi People's
Committee Chief Architect's Office for approval. Amendments were made and these were reviewed by the
Science and Technology Board. Next, various interested ministries (Ministry of Construction, Ministry of
Transport, General Department of Land Management, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment,
Ministry of Water, etc.) were asked to comment. This consultation process was presided over by the Vice-
Minister from the Ministry of Construction. Finally, plans were sent to the Prime Minister, who reportedly
sought approval from the CPV politburo. The Prime Minister then passed a decree that gave the Master
Plan Hanoi 2010 legislative force.
247 A similar planning regime exists in Ho Chi Minh City, where a Master Plan was recently
approved under a Decree issued by the Prime Minister on January 16, 1993. The Plan was drafted by the
Chief Architect of Ho Chi Minh City, Le Van Nam. See Prime Minister Approves of Ho Chi Minh City
Growth Plan, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Feb. 8. 1993, at 15.
248 Nguyen Lan Interview, supra note 112; Phan Dinh Dai Interview, supra note 115. It should be
noted that research on the Plan for Protection, Rehabilitation and Development of the Ancient Street Area
of Hanoi was carried out by the NIURP. The plan was approved by the Prime Minister on April 19, 1995.
249 The regulations are based on the Official Report on Plan for Protection, Rehabilitation and
Development of the Ancient Street Area of Hanoi prepared by the NIURP. The regulations were approved
by the Ministry of Construction ("MOC") on March 30, 1995 and the Prime Minister on April 19, 1995.
The planning scheme has already been approved by the Hanoi People's Committee and Chief Architect's
Office, and the Hanoi master-plan was approved by the Government early in 1995. See Hanoi Masterplan
Gets Approval, supra note 107; Interview with Nguyen Van Quy, Vice President SENA Corporation, in
Hanoi, Vietnam (Jan. 21, 1994).
250 The Council is led by the Chairman of the Hoan Kiem People's Committee and is comprised of
central-level ministries. Interview with Dr. Nguyen Son Lo, Director, Institute for Urban Technology and
Development ("IUTD") in Hanoi. Vietnam (Jan. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Nguyen Son Lo Interview].
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unlikely that the Hoan Kiem district planning scheme will significantly
deviate from the Master Plan. It does not necessarily follow, however, that
planning decisions made by the people's committee will always comply
with the Master Plan, or for that matter with the detailed district plan.
25 1
C. Bureaucratic Compliance with Land Laws
1. Commercial Exploitation ofAdministrative Authority
Measuring bureaucratic efficiency is notoriously difficult,252 particu-
larly where organizational rules are recent and incomplete (such as the Law
on Land 1993) and statistics are unreliable. Efficiency may best be assessed
from observable action. Observation of the discrepancy between statutory
expectations and the actual behavior of officials furnishes a useful case
study. What distinguishes land management in Vietnam are the tensions
between central-level planning and construction legislation and decision
making at the local level. The dynamics of this relationship may be
explored by comparing building approval procedures set out in municipal
construction regulations with the modus operandi of the Hanoi building
industry.
a. Land use licenses and construction permits are subject to approval
by chief architect's office
Except for large projects of national interest, 253 applications for land
use licenses254 and construction permits255 must be approved by the chief
251 Corruption and tax enforcement continue to encourage illegal construction. See M. Mathes,
Drawn and Quartered, VIETNAM ECON. TIMES, Sept. 1995, at 24-25.
252 It is difficult to monitor bureau output, accurately assess accounting data, or know whether the
bureau's choice of internal procedure is socially optimal. See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Eric
Maskin, A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms, 48 ECONOMETRIA 1507 (1980);
Roger Guesnuerie & Jean-Jacques Laffont, A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems
with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm, 25 J. PUBLIC ECON., 329, 329-64 (1984).
253 Large projects with or without foreign capital must be approved by the Prime Minister. See
Decision No. 366 HDBT, Regulations on Evaluation of Projects for Foreign-Owned Capital, art. 4 (Nov. 7,
1991); Decree No. 177-CP, Regulations on the Management of Investment and Construction, art. 6 (1994).
254 See, e.g., Instruction B, Applying for Construction Land Use Licence, Guidance on Instructions
for Applications for Construction Land Use Licences 601/KTS-TH, Chief Architect's Office, Hanoi
People's Comm, (June 1, 1993).
255 See, e.g., Instructions on Applying for New Construction, Rehabilitation and Separation of
Architectural Works 602/KTS-TH, Chief Architect's Office. Hanoi People's Comm. (June 11, 1993). See
also Nguyen Tien Lap, Licensing for Construction, I VIETNAM L. & LEGAL F., July 1995, at 14-15.
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architect's office ("CAO") attached to city-level people's committees. 256
When reviewing allotment and development applications, the CAO exer-
cises a virtually unaccountable discretion. Appeals against unfavorable
decisions must, in the first instance, be lodged with the CAO, which of
course was the body that made the initial determination. As a judge in its
own cause,257 the CAO has little reason to fear ministerial supervision,258
and may, within the limits of the Penal Code, 259 exploit its wide administra-
tive authority virtually free of independent review. 260
The absence of accountability comes at a cost. As a precondition to
approval, applicants are reportedly encouraged to use architectural service
companies 26 1 controlled by the CAO and/or people's committee. 262 These
organizations prepare building plans and process and lodge development
applications. Officials justify this practice on the grounds that service
companies work closely with the CAO and understand the unpublished
nuances of municipal policy. 263 Use of authorized service companies is not
compulsory, though independent consultants complain of delays in modify-
ing plans to meet the CAO's rather vague and protean interpretation of
building and planning legislation.
256 See Instruction B. Apply for Construction Land Use Licence, Guidance on Instructions for
Applications for Construction Land Use Licences 601/KTS-TH, Chief Architect's Office, Hanoi People's
Comm. Jan. II, 1993).
257 A system of self-referential administrative review offends most notions of natural justice. See
S.A. DE SMITH., JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 226-28 (1973).
258 There has been no reported instance where the Chief Architect has been overruled by the
Minis of Construction or Prime Minister. Ha Van Que Interview, supra note 125.
259 PENAL CODE, arts. 220-221, 226 (1986) (official negligence, abusing official position and
powers, and accepting bribes). See Phong Lan, Carry on the Anti-corruption Struggle: New Requirements,
Strong Measures, SAIGON GIAI PHONG, Apr. 2, 1994, at 2.
260 Since the Chief Architect is equal in rank to a Vice Chairman of a People's Committee, his
decisions can only be reviewed by the Prime Minister. VIETNAM CONST. art. 114(3) (1992); Ha Van Que
Interview, supra note 125.
261 For example, the SENA Corporation, an entity owned by the Institute for Urban Technology
and Development (a body established by the Hanoi People's Committee), carries out much of the large-
scale architectural design, civil engineering, and planning work for private developers 'referred' by the
Chief Architect's Office. Nguyen Son Lo Interview, supra note 250. A similar network of service
companies reportedly serves the Ho Chi Minh City, Chief Architect's Office.
262 It is unlawful for an official to directly own a private business, Law on Companies, art. 6
(1990); Decree 221 HDBT, Regulations of the Council of Ministers Making Detailed Provisions for a
Number of Articles in the Law on Enterprises, arts. 2, 3 (July 23, 1991). As a consequence, service
companies are owned by people's committees, local mass organizations, and/or by private individuals
associated with officials. Research in this area is complicated by two factors. Officials are understandably
reluctant to speak about these issues, and will not formally acknowledge their comments. There is no
public record of corporate information, making it difficult to identify ownership, office bearers, and
members of service companies.
263 Ha Van Que Interview, supra note 125.
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b. Leases between foreigners and Vietnamese subject to approval by
people's committees
Commercial exploitation of state administrative authority occurs in
other areas of land management. Despite clear legislative provisions264
stating that foreigners may own residential houses, in practice, ownership is
not permitted. Foreigners are permitted to lease from state businesses, other
state organizations or entities, and private Vietnamese citizens. 265 All
leases with foreigners must be approved by provincial/city-level people's
committees266 before they become enforceable. Registration is withheld
unless leases have been concluded with the assistance of an authorized land
service company. These enterprises are frequently owned or controlled by
the people's committee (or associated mass organizations) authorized to
grant approval. Foreigners complain that service companies do not perform
substantive functions. For instance, leases are negotiated in advance so that
they are ready to sign even before a service company is engaged; service
companies are nevertheless entitled to charge fees ranging from four to six
percent of the rent payable over the term of the lease. 267 One possible
advantage of this system is that the local people's committee may feel
contractually or morally bound to use its coercive power to recover
compensation where land is leased to a foreigner without good title. In the
south, where overseas Vietnamese continue to reclaim abandoned prop-
erty,268 a guarantee of good title is especially important.
264 Ordinance on Residential Housing, arts. 16, 17 (1991); Decree No. 60-CP, On Ownership of
Residential Housing and Right to Use Land in Urban Areas, arts. 21, 22 (1994). See Dao Quong Binh &
Jeremy Grant, Coming Up Roses (Interview with Nguyen Manh Kiem, Vice Minister for Construction), 3
VIETNAM EcON. TIMES 24, 25 (1994).
265 Decree No. 56/CP, Regulation on Leasing Houses in Vietnam to Foreigners and Vietnamese
Settled Abroad, arts. I, 2 (Sept. 18, 1995); Ordinance on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign
Organizations and Individuals Who Lease Land in Vietnam, (Oct. 14, 1994) (in VIETNAM LAW & LEGAL
FORUM, Nov. 1994, at 28).
266 Regulations on the Lease of Premises and Recruitment of Labour by Foreigners and Foreign
Nationals of Vietnamese Origin, Council of Ministers, art. B 4(c) (Nov. 10, 1992).
267 Circular on Leases and Employment by Foreigners No. 03-TT-LB, pt. A-1ll(l), (2) (Apr. 8,
1991).
268 For the rules governing disputes between holders of ancien regime title and occupiers, see
Decree No 60-CP, supra note 264, art. 10.
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2. The Effect of Patronage on Compliance
As a Neo-Confucian, relationship-driven society,269 family/group 270
patronage undoubtedly dominates in Vietnam; however, there are other
kinds of linkages that bind 27 1 land management bureaucracies. Party influ-
ence over the bureaucracy is maintained by ensuring that party members
hold key positions. 272 In this regard, the party exhibits many of the charac-
teristics of a neo-Confucian "superfamily" 273 and secret society,274 even
though it is governed by an internal statute. 275 Party censure often signals
the end to further promotion, forced retirement, reduction in retirement
benefits, or direct removal from office. 276
a. Neutral or beneficial effects from patronage
"Super village" organizations 277 and family networks have a strong
cultural antecedence in Vietnam. 278  Such organizations and networks
269 Confucian social obligations to the family are often regarded as the driving force behind East
Asian nepotism. See MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78-81 (1958). These obligations have been co-
opted and integrated by the Marxist elite in Vietnam. See NGUYEN KHAI VIEN, TRADITION AND
REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM 47-52 ( 1974); Weggel, supra note 53, at 418.
270 Recent sociological writings in Vietnam suggest that the 'closed' traditional family is
transforming into a more open grouping which for commercial reasons may coopt influential or skilled
people without common lineage. See generally Le Ngoc Lan, The Question of Family and the Realisation
of the Functions of the Family in the Present Society, [1994] 2 VIETNAM SOC. Sa. 70, 71, 74; M.
Beresford, Interpretation of the Vietnamese Economic Reforms 1979-85, in RESEARCHING THE
VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC REFORMS: 1979-86, at 11-13 (Australian-Vietnam Research Project, Monograph
Series #1) (Jan. 1995).
271 See Murray Hiebert, No Dong No Deal: Corruption is Spreading Rapidly in the North, FAR E.
ECON. REV., June 25, 1992, at 13; Thayer, supra note 52.
272 See Vo Chi Cong Discusses New Constitution. supra note 218. "Party members and those
entrusted by the party must directly hold essential positions in the state apparatus. Without this practice the
party is not a ruling one and is considered an outside of the administration or the party will participate in
the administration with a weak role." Id
273 JAMIESON, supra note 14, at 217-18, 256-57.
274 See Weggel, supra note 53, at 418. Secret societies have a long history in Vietnam. See ter
Haar Borend, Messianism and the Heaven and Earth Society: Approaches to Heaven and Earth Society
Texts, in SECRET SOCIETIES RECONSIDERED: PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN
SOCIALIST CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 153, 153, 162-63 (David Ownby & Mary Somers Heidhues eds.,
1993).
275 For example, see Thayer, supra note 52, at 20. The current party statute was adopted at the
Fourth Party Congress (Dec. 1976), and it has been amended on several subsequent occasions.
276 See Ho Chi Minh City Reviews Anti-Corruption Work (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam broadcast, May
29, 1994), in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-104, May 31, 1994, at 71; Phong Lan, supra note 259, at 2.
27- The "super village" is a term applied to extra legal organizations that arrange themselves as
corporate identities, an extension of the traditional Vietnamese village organization. See JAMIESON, supra
note 14, at 213-20, 256-57.
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linked bureaucrats to society through the exchange of information and offi-
cial favors in return for revenue.279 Funds received through patronage often
benefit an entire organization. Commentators suggest, for example, that
"fees" received from architectural service companies are used by the CAO
to improve working conditions, retrain, and remunerate underpaid state
employees who might otherwise spend less time attending to official
functions while earning a second income.280 Patronage also takes non-
monetary forms. Influence can be used to assist family or patrons overcome
legal problems, bypass waiting lists for public housing, health, fire, and
labor permits as well as secure coveted university entrance.281
In a society where state salaries are generally insufficient to sustain
even a modest standard of living, state bodies commonly augment their
budgets with funds generated by service companies or research institutes. 282
Naturally, bureaucracies favor associated state business interests and use
their discretion to prevent or limit competition from services provided by
private capital. Society distinguishes between state patronage and the
acceptance of bribes. 283 For example, service companies trade with the
public and provide value to their clients and society in a way that direct
monetary bribes do not.284 While allotment, planning, and construction
278 See Whitmore, supra note 13, at 296, 301-305; Truong Buu Lam, Patterns of Vietnamese
Response to Foreign Intervention: 1858-1900, 12 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD., 49-54 (1967) (translating
Tran Hung-Pao, Call to the Officers and Soldiers of the Army (1285)); Hiebert, supra note 27 1.
279 Accounts of Vietnam under the IU and Nguyen dynasties suggest that officials and their
subordinates often took advantage of their public office in spite of meticulously prescribed criminal
penalties for corruption. See TA VAN TAI, supra note 19, at 204-10.
280 These impressions were gleaned from informal discussions held with employees of Hanoi and
Ho Chi Minh People's Committees and building contractors. Bribes received by corrupt village officials
for illegally issuing land use rights were paid into the village budget. See Four Sentenced Over Land
Deals, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Sept. 4, 1995, at 4 (village Chairman and others given suspended
prison sentence for granting land use rights in return for deposits made to the village budget).
281 See Le Phuoc Tho, Effect on Important Change in Cadre-Related Work in the New Situation
(NHAN DAN, Sept. 16, 1993, at 3), translated in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 93-197, Oct. 14, 1993, at
71-72; Hoang Phuoc Hiep et al., supra note 223.
282 See generally Natalie Lichtenstein, A Survey of Vietnam's Legal Framework in Transition,
Policy Research Working Paper 1291, The World Bank Legal Department, East Asia and Pacific Division,
14-18 (Apr. 1994).
283 However, article 226 of the Penal Code 1986 prohibits officials from taking "bribes of money
or other forms, directly or through an intermediary, to perform or refrain from performing certain jobs as
requested by the person offering bribes."
284 Nguyen Tran Bat Interview, supra note 173. Although corruption can no doubt be
characterized as a sociological problem of deviance, this discussion is concerned with disobedience of law.
See R. Seidman, Why do People Obey the Law? The Case of Corruption in Developing Countries, 5
BRITISH J. L. SOC. 45, 50-52 (1978); R. KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988); W. Wertheim,
Sociological Aspects of Corruption in South East Asia, I SOCIOLOGIA NEERLANDICA 129, 138-42 (1963).
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regulations are not publicly available 285 or remain ambiguous, 28 6 profes-
sional advice given by those closely connected with regulatory authorities
will continue to be valued by developers. This service is quasi-official in
the sense that it provides detailed technical information determined by state
authorities that mimics the function of prescriptive legislation.
b. Negative effects from patronage
Not all aspects of patronage have neutral, much less beneficial conse-
quences. The inevitability of corruption in Vietnam has yet to be
determined. The broad discretion given to local authorities generates little
incentive to comply with NIURP-sponsored Master Plans or enact detailed
local plans. The bureaucracy's monopoly over land development informa-
tion undoubtedly places at an advantage those who enjoy a patron-client
relationship, thereby adding to the cost of development for others.
Patronage also diminishes the importance of merit in determining the eco-
nomic and social value of development. Bribes permit private investors to
gain control over decision-making, shaking public confidence in abstract
laws and distorting the pattern of investment and urban development.
Discretionary controls breed corruption, giving dishonest officials a vested
interest in retaining and increasing this form of governance. 28 7 Given this
broad discretion, it is surprising to find a strong rhetorical commitment
within the Hanoi Chief Architect's Office to the Master Plan in general and
preservation of the historic Hoan Kiem district in particular.288
Placing constraints on bureaucratic discretion, however, can cause
paralysis in decision making at the district level. Consider, for example, the
collection of land transfer taxes. Until recently, 28 9 the rate of taxation and
285 There has been a recent improvement in the publishing and display of planning schemes,
although they are presented as an established fact without a formal system of community comment. See
Citizens Respond to Masterplan, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Sept. 26, 1994, at 16.
286 See Build Your Own Houses, supra note I; Nguyen Mai, Infrastructure and Real Estate:
Incentives and Priorities, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Nov. 8, 1993, at 22.
287 See generally SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 72, at 151-60; GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN
DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 1126, 1131 (1968).
288 See Ngoc Anh. Hanoi Development Master Plan Unveiled. VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV.. Sept.
19, 1994, at 9. The Chief Architect's Office was formed in 1993 under Decree No. 322 BXD TDT from
the Ministry of Construction on December 28, 1993. It inherited many problems from the pre-existing
construction departments. Ha Van Que Interview, supra note 125: Nguyen Lan Interview, supra note 112.
289 Recent legislation includes Decree No. 87/CP, Stipulating Price List of Categories of Land, art.
2(4) (1994) (setting forth land values to be used by district level people's committee when changing
allotment fees for residential land) and Circular No. 2 TCITCT, Guiding the Implementation of Decree No.
89 of the Goverment on Collection of Land Use Levy and Land Administration Fee (Jan. 4, 1995). It
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methods of assessment were not stipulated in legislation. Without prescrip-
tive guidelines, local authorities were reportedly reluctant to test the limits
of their discretionary authority, and risk official punishment 290 by either
under- or overcharging land valuation fees. In the meantime, few land
transfer certificates were issued.29 1
D. Absence of Private Compliance with Land Laws
Commentators suggest that the enforcement of planning and
construction regulations has been compromised by the uncertainty
surrounding the responsibilities of the chief architect's office.292
Regulations issued by the Ministry of Construction, for example, require the
chief architect to formulate policy and monitor construction, but leave the
actual detection of building infringements to inspectors employed by district
people's committees.293 Imprecise drafting compounds the confusion by
failing to clearly delineate the administrative responsibilities of the MOC
and CAO. Even though the MOC is the constitutionally superior instrumen-
tality,294 an overlapping jurisdiction at times hinders the enforcement of
building provisions.
1. Examples and Causes of Private Noncompliance
The bureaucracy has not been successful at enforcing the land laws.
A survey conducted by the Hanoi People's Committee showed that of 170
new houses constructed during the December quarter 1992, 150 were built
without building permits. To make matters worse, of the few who had
obtained official approval, most had disregarded the maximum two-story
height restriction. Public land had also been appropriated by using landfill
remains to be seen whether the authorities will be reassured by these rules and accelerate the allotment
process.
290 Negligent official action is a crime against the state and may be investigated by the procuracy.
PENAL CODE, arts. 220-221 (1986 as amended).
291 Cf Browne, supra note 94, at 16 (since guidelines have been prepared, the process of issuing
land tenure certificates is outstripping the capacity of mapping agencies to keep pace).
292 Nguyen Lan Interview, supra note 112; Annalisa Koeman, Planning into Practice. VIETNAM
INVESTMENT REV., Feb. 13 1995, at 27 (interview with Hanoi city planner Ha Van Que).
293 Decision 102-BXD-GD, Regulations on Quality Management of Construction Projects, arts. 3,
26, 32, 34, 35 (Jan. 15, 1992).
294 VIETNAM CONST. art. 112 (1992).
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to build out into the lake or by squatting on public land reclaimed from the
Red River.29 5 Although the Hanoi People's Committee issued a circular
demanding suspension of all construction in the villages and wards around
the lake, 296 building activity has reportedly increased.297 In the meantime,
the area has rapidly become a patchwork of authorized and
urban-traditional land use.298
A pilot land survey project 299 carried out in Gia Lam, a small semi-
rural settlement on the outskirts of Hanoi confirms this view. Of the 480
households selected, only 78 conformed to the law and were entitled to land
tenure certificates. The remainder were ineligible for a range of reasons,
including illegal transfer, occupation, and construction, and non-payment of
transfer and land taxes. The survey team concluded that if the General
Department of Land Management is to achieve its aim of registering and
issuing certificates for all urban land by the year 2005, an efficient evalu-
ation and adjudication process should be established to identify illegality
and prescribe remedial action.
Wars and collectivization have created great social dislocation. Land
is frequently occupied by those who received title from an ancien regime or
an official body that is no longer recognized as having had the authority to
allot land (i.e., the Revolutionary Committees). 300 Still more residents are
noted on registers compiled by district people's committees, but have not
been issued a certificate of land use and housing ownership. 30 1 In view of
the extent of non-conformity, the regularization of titles is only likely to be
successful where criminal penalties are combined with an administrative
discretion which exculpates all but the most flagrant violations. The Decree
on Ownership of Residential Housing and Right to Use Land in Urban
Areas302 represents a policy shift in this direction. Provided housing is
constructed within a residential zone, the decree allows long term, but
undocumented occupiers to regularize their land holdings.
Where resources are available, city people's committees may take
extra-legal action to solve the problem of illegal housing. The Ho Chi Minh
295 See Hai Thanh, supra note 95.
296 See Hai Thanh, supra note 95.
297 Nguyen Son Lo Interview, supra note 250; Hong Sam, supra note 104, at 3.
298 See supra part III.C. Land development that proceeds without regard to laws or the
instrumental arms of the state may be described as urban-traditional.
299 See Feasibility Study, supra note 162, at 116-20.
300 Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70; Nguyen Khai Interview, supra note 82.
301 Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70.
302 Decree No. 60-CP, art. 10(3) (July 5, 1994).
VOL. 5 No. I
URBAN LAND MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM
City People's Committee has recently allocated funds to remove or renovate
shanty houses built along the banks of Nhieu Loc and Thi Nghe canals.303
This strategy will require the People's Committee to rezone the canal
embankment into residential use and transfer the existing urban-traditional
land into the authorized system. Funds for projects of this nature are limited
and narrowly focused to assist war invalids, widows, state employees,
health workers, and members of the armed services. 304 If land registration
is to be normalized by the target date, bureaucrats will need to generously
exercise their discretion 305  to exculpate illegal occupation and
construction. 306  The immediate cost to the state in lost fines and
registration fees would soon be recovered through land 307 and transfer
taxes. 308
2. Futility of Sanctions in Promoting Private Compliance
Even with the best intentions, it is beyond the resources of the Hanoi
Chief Architect's Office to monitor and control all building activities. 309
The problem is in part structural since official detection depends upon
compliance with registration procedures. Once developers have applied for
construction and planning permission,310 they must register their projects
with construction departments attached to people's committees. Unless
developers notify authorities by filing development applications, district
people's committee staff reportedly find it difficult to monitor illegal
construction and occupation. 311  Commentators suggest, however, that
303 Housing Program Needs Much Support, supra note 102.
304 Housing Program Needs Much Support, supra note 102.
305 Although the specific rates have not been enacted, it is reported that where a land use right is
lawfully allotted, but a building erected on the land is illegal, a small fine may be levied. If the building is
legal, but illegally located, the fine will be very substantial. Where the land use does not comply with
zoning stipulations or encroaches on state land such as railways, there can be no validation and eventually,
depending upon the seriousness of the case, the building will be destroyed. Nguyen Khai Interview, supra
note 82. See also Decree No. 60-CP, art. 10(3) (1994) (pertaining to cases where the owner does not
possess any or some of the required documents).
306 Decree No. 60-CP, art. 10 (1994) (on certificates of ownership and land use rights).
307 Ordinance on Residential Housing, arts. 2, 3, 18 (1991).
308 Law on Land Transfer Tax (1994).
309 Ha Van Que Interview, supra note 125.
310 Decree No. 177-CP, On Regulation on the, Management of Investment and Construction, arts.
21, 27 (Oct. 20, 1994); Decision 22-BXD-QLXD, Regulations on Registration of Construction Activities,
Arts 9-13 MOC (Jan. 26, 1993); Nguyen Lan Interview, supra note 112.
311 Nguyen Son Lo Interview, supra note 250. Other state agencies also have difficulty in
monitoring new construction. The Hanoi Power Service, a state-owned electricity supplier, for example
has lost track of many new customers. See Nguyen Chi Thanh, Thieves and Bureaucrats Block Efforts to
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given the right motivation, considerably more could be done with the exist-
ing resources. 3 12 This view is supported by an enforcement experiment
whereby district people's committees in Hanoi monitored purchases of
building materials as a means of tracing unauthorized construction.
Although the detection rate significantly increased, compliance did not
show a corresponding improvement. 313 This discrepancy was blamed on
corrupt officials; it was concluded that low wages unquestionably increase
susceptibility to bribery.3 14
Reliance on sanctions to enforce compliance has demonstrably failed.
Unwieldy provisions allow people's committees to demolish illegally
constructed houses,3 15 a draconian penalty that is rarely used. Small fines
may also be levied, but as a fraction of the value of the illegal structure, they
are treated as affordable penalties or negative licenses.3 I6
The Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee recently issued new
regulations to control illegal construction. The regulations provide for a
range of fines from 200,000 up to 1,000,000 dong for serious violations. 317
This flexibility enables the People's Committee to fashion deterrence
strategies inducing non-conformers to comply. 3 Is If the land bureaucracy is
to regain control of urban fringe development, legal mechanisms must
encourage articulation from the urban-traditional to the authorized system.
Such mechanisms may take the form of once only fines, 3 19 or incremental
penalties combined with rewards such as access to low cost construction
loans and architectural advice. But these measures will be disregarded as
Modernise Power GrId, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV.. Oct. 25, 1993, at 7; Nguyen Tri Dung, supra note
124.
312 Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview. supra note 108.
313 Nguyen Lan Interview, supra note 112.
314 Nguyen Lan Interview, supra note 112; Koeman, supra note 292, at 27.
315 See Ordinance on Residential Housing, arts. 12(1)c and (2), 19 (March 26, 1991); Decision No.
103BXD-GD, Regulations on Quality Management of Construction Projects (June 15, 1992) (central-level
legislation delegates authority to local government).
316 See, e.g., Hai Thanh, supra note 95; Ngyuen Tri Dung, supra note 124.
317 Decision No. 1076/QD-UB-ND. On Promulgation of the Regulations on Penalties for
Administrative Violations in the Field of Construction in Ho Chi Minh City, People's Comm. (Apr. 13,
1994) (fines range from US$20 to $100).
38 Id.
319 It is possible to pay a fine to temporarily legijimize the 'existence' of an illegally constructed
building in Hanoi, but there is no clear legislative basis for this procedure. See Nguyen Tri Dung, supra
note 107.
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long as people's committees continue to believe that vigorous enforcement
frightens away foreign investment.320
3. Cultural Reasons for Private Noncompliance
In addition to the absence of fear that serious sanctions will be
enforced, private individuals hold a cultural antipathy towards bureaucrats.
This antipathy is only reinforced in those circumstances where the authori-
ties are seen to prosper from the legal system. To make matters worse, even
when individuals wish to obey the law, compliance is made difficult by
vague and sometimes unpublished planning and building regulations.
Noncompliance also stems from the lack of information about exist-
ing laws. Madam Ngo Ba Tanh, Vice President of the Vietnam Lawyers'
Association, argues:
[t]he conversion process in Vietnam requires two very impor-
tant transformations within Vietnamese society. First, the laws
are meaningless until bureaucrats learn to enforce them ....
Secondly, the people themselves require education so that they
can understand the concepts of the new system. "Our way of
publishing the laws is very bad .... Vietnam has no tradition
of making legal information available to the general public. 321
Ideological change through education is a long term solution. Authorities
report that even after extensive press coverage of the Land Law 1993, non-
conformers routinely plead ignorance. 322 On a more fundamental level,
unless rules are practical and coincide with community moral, ideological,
and cultural norms, they are unlikely, at least initially, to be internalized and
obeyed.323
4. Additional Disincentive to Comply
Costs create barriers to entry into the authorized land use system.
Administrative fees and survey charges are incurred whenever an occupier
320 Nguyen Lan Interview, supra note 112 (speaking about preservation of the Hoan Kien district,
Hano); Koeman, supra note 292, at 27.
32 1 Sachs, supra note 16 (quoting in part Ngo Ba Thanh).
322 Hai Thanh, supra note 95.
323 The literature in this area is vast. See, e.g., SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 72, at 119-26.
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applies to a people's committee for a Land Tenure Certificate and Housing
Ownership Certificate.324 Before a certificate can be issued, buildings are
appraised according to a statutory valuation scale,325 often pricing the trans-
action beyond the means of a land user. Once a certificate is issued, land is
subject to an annual tax.326
By halving the number of officially registered land transfers since its
enactment in June 1994, the recently introduced legislation on land rights
transfer taxes has had a particularly dramatic effect upon the authorized land
use system. 32 7 A forty percent levy is imposed when farm land is converted
to another use. The impost is only paid where the transferee fails to culti-
vate the land, and is designed to limit the spread of cities into rural areas. In
practice, city fringe farmers still sub-divide their land and avoid taxes by
selling outside the authorized land system. 328 Using the language of law
and economic theorists, land holders decide whether to obey laws by refer-
ence to their economic self-interest.3 29
Compliance with planning and construction regulations also adds to
the cost of development. Planning approval commonly requires fourteen
separate official approvals taking from eighteen months to two years. 330 It
is hardly surprising where the benefits of compliance include taxes, build-
ing, health and fire safety regulations, and time delays, occupiers choose to
remain outside the authorized system.
324 Ordinance on Residential Housing, arts. I I, 18 (1991). It is reported that many residents of
Hanoi who are entitled to claim housing ownership certificates have not done so because of the attendant
costs. Their occupation would in any event be noted in Residential registration books held at the local
district people's committee. Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70. In rural areas, the cost of issuing a
Land Tenure Certificate varies from 20,000-70,000 dong per hectare. In some circumstances, fees may be
paid by the rural commune. See Browne, supra note 94, at 15, 16.325 Decree No. 87-CP Stipulating Price List of Categories of Land, (Aug. 17, 1994).
326 Ordinance on Residential Housing Land Tax, arts. 2. 3 (1991).
327 See Nguyen Van Phu, supra note 3, at 18-19; Tax on Farmland Transfer Under Scrutiny in Ho
Chi Minh City, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV.. May 23, 1994, at 17. A 20% tax applies to the transfer of
urban land.
328 Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70; Ha Van Que Interview, supra note 125. See
Instruction No. 1044-KTN, Prime Minister (Mar. 3. 1995) (temporary halt on the conversion of wet-rice
land for housing and other purposes) (sighted by the author at the Ministry of Justice Legal Information
Center).
329 See generally R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986); G. Calabresi & D.
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972) (the self-interest theory).
330 Ha Van Que Interview, supra note 125. See also Nguyen Tri Dung, supra note 107, at 16;
Build Your Own Houses. Says Minister, supra note I.
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V. STRATEGIES FOR A LAND MANAGEMENT REGIME
A. Sources of the Bureaucracy's Failure to Obtain Compliance
1. Conflict Between Formal Law and Local Land Use Customs
The complex interplay between the instrumental use of law and
custom, ideology, and bureaucratic culture should not be ignored.
Professors Ann and Robert Seidman have identified four prerequisites for
the instrumental use of law.33 1 First, good law must specify achievable
implementation. Second, law-makers and implementors must understand
the closely intertwined relationship between the legal order and political-
economic institutions. Third, they must conduct ongoing research to iden-
tify the behavioral consequences of law; and fourth, they must ensure that
the form of law, including its wording, adequately communicates its
prescriptions for changing behavior.
The process of legal development in economically successful East
Asian states provides empirical evidence that formal legal rationality is not
always necessary and may actually inhibit modernization. 332 In such coun-
tries the normative legal system is incomplete; existing laws are often
poorly drafted and poorly understood by the public. But problems are not
limited to drafting and publication defects. As applied to Vietnam, formal
legal rationality also tends to categorize authorized land use as legal and
urban-traditional land use as illegal. This simplification ignores the patron-
age networks, property demarcations, and dispute resolution practices that
have developed without much regard for state instrumentalities and have
largely shaped land use behavior in Vietnam.
The coexistence of Neo-Confucian values and Western rights-based
law creates a divided legal geography 333 in which formal law does not
address the needs of entire communities. 334 In this divided legal geography,
formal law's lack of relevance fosters a social attitude that rejects any
331 SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 72, at 43-44.
332 See Douglas, supra note 195; THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 353-88 (Hideo Tanaka & Malcolm
Smith eds., 1976); WORLD BANK RESEARCH REPORT. supra note 195, ch. 7; CHOWDHURY & ISLAM, supra
note 195, ch. 5.
333 Neo-Confucian values embedded in Vietnamese culture seek to personalize relationships so that
social control is carried out within the context of social relationships. Western law, based upon atomistic
individuality, may not easily integrate into a culture where, even in comparatively Westernized urban
areas, aperson's legal identity tends to be fused with that of his or her family or business group.
33, This is especially true for those on the urban fringe.
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comprehensive obligation to comply with an external rule unless it coin-
cides with community sentiment. In a society where over three quarters of
urban development breaches the law,335 it is time to rethink the concept of
legal domination and consider the possibility that several legal systems co-
exist in Vietnam. 336
Alternatives to the "all or nothing approach" in which formal laws
either convey legitimacy or they do not should be considered.
Theoretically, administrative discretion is sufficiently flexible to act as a
bridge, allowing urban-traditional land users to integrate step-by-step into
the authorized system. Discretionary regulation would allow subtle combi-
nations of formality and informality, enabling administrators to deal on a
case-by-case basis with the extremely complex inter-relationships between
authorized and urban-traditional land use.337
To the extent that laws tend to be internalized and obeyed 338 where
they are compatible with and preserve established cultural and legal princi-
ples, a legal system in which urban-traditional norms have been assimilated
may elicit social compliance. For example, the rules governing rural land
use are generally obeyed; 339 perhaps this due to their similarity with tradi-
tionally rural practices. 340 In contrast, urban land policy is not derived from
principles embedded in Vietnamese culture, perhaps contributing to wide-
spread noncompliance with the formal rules.34 1
335 See supra part IlI.C.
336 Coexisting land control systems has an historical basis arising from the social dichotomy
between the Confucian rulers and predominantly rural Taoist, Buddhist populace. See Fforde & Seneque,
supra note 78, at 318-19; Yu Insun, Law and Family in 17th and 18th Century Vietnam 56-79 (1978)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan): A. WOODSIDE, COMMUNITY AND REVOLUTION IN
MODERN VIETNAM 21, 118-20 (1976); S. Young, The Law of Property and Elite Prerogatives During
Vietnam's U, Dynasty (1428-1788), 10 J. ASIAN HIST. 1 (1976). French and Soviet, and (in the South)
American influence has amplified the rural-urban divide. But the mosaic of land control systems is not
simply the product of cultural difference; the administration of formal rules is also a determinant.
137 See generally D. GALLIGAN. DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL
DISCRETION ch. 4 (1986). The "Veblen-Ayres dichotomy" suggests that institutions may not be an
appropriate locus for social change. See Thomas De Gregori et al., An Institutionalist Theory of
Bureaucracy, in BUREAUCRACY: THREE PARADIGMS 84-86 (Neil Garston ed.. 1993).
338 Yet, compliance will presumably be enhanced should these rules embody community values.
See generally J. Raz, On the Functions of Law. in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 280-87 (A.W.
Simpson ed., 1973); J.R. PENNOCK & J. CHAPMAN, THE LIMITS OF LAW 2-5 (1974).
339 Phan Huu Chi Interview, supra note 76: Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70.
340 Phan Huu Chi Interview, supra note 76.
341 See supra part IV.D.
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2. Abuse of Discretionary Authority by Members of the Bureaucracy
a. Inadequacy of existing system for review of administrative acts
Without a system of independent judicial review, no amount of skill-
ful legal drafting will, on its own, ensure uniform bureaucratic outcomes.
Transparent legislation and a separation of administrative and commercial
functions are insufficient to remove all opportunities for the bureaucracy to
benefit from discretionary authority. Except for highly prescriptive techni-
cal rules, such as those governing the acceptable range of dimensions for
window frames, legislation must be interpreted before it can be
administered. If laws are to constrain the bureaucracy, the system of justice
must be autonomous 342 and make officials accountable not only to their
superiors, but also to those affected by their decisions. For this to happen,
the review institution must be structured in such a way that provides access
to the poor and socially disenfranchised, those most likely to breach land
laws.
An extra-judicial machinery for reviewing complaints already exists.
Complaints may be lodged with the land management body that issued the
contentious decision in the first instance.343 It is likely that grievances will
be addressed under this system. In theory, an appeal may be formally
referred to the Prime Minister,344 who can abrogate decisions of people's
committees or chief architects. The authoritative people's procurators may
also act on complaints, but only when a decision involves actual illegal-
ity.34 5 The Ministry of Construction has the power to issue warnings, or in
more serious cases, promulgate resolutions or decisions346 directed at
recalcitrant people's committees. As a final resort, the Prime Minister may
be persuaded to dismiss the Chairman and/or Vice Chairman of the offend-
ing people's committee. 347 This is only likely to occur with the consent of
342 See Trubek, supra note 9, at 9.
343 Law on Land, art. 38(2) (1993) (Appeals against unfavorable land allotments); Instruction B,
Applying for Construction Land Use Licence, Guidance on Instructions for Applications for Construction
Land Use Licences, Chief Architect's Office, Hanoi People's Comm., 602/KTS-TH (June 1993) (appeals
against the rejection of construction or planning permits must be made to the Chief Architect's Office).
344 VIETNAM CONST. art. 114(4)-(5)(1992).
345 Law on State Procurators (1982) (sighted by author at Ministry of Justice Information Center).
Complaints may also be lodged according to the People's Inspectorate Ordinance on the Punishment of
Administrative Violations (Nov. 30, 1984).
346 VIETNAM CONST. art. 115 (1992).
347 Id. art. 114(3).
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the CPV. These administrative avenues of appeal undoubtedly reduce arbi-
trariness, but they also act like a pressure valve, releasing dissatisfaction
without establishing a body of review that is "independent of state, its
workings and its ideology." 348
Gaps in the existing regulatory system are evinced by hotel construct-
ion bordering Hoan Kiem Lake in Hanoi. 349 In 1994 the Hanoi People's
Committee recently authorized construction of an eight-story hotel3 50 in this
historic precinct. Planning approval took over two years and was only
granted when a Hong Kong-based investor agreed to enter into a joint
venture with Haneco, an import-export service company owned by the
Hanoi People's Committee's External Economic Relations Department.
Acting on complaints from various professional bodies such as the Vietnam
Architects Associations, the NIURP attempted to prohibit the Hanoi
People's Committee from issuing a construction license to the hotel devel-
opers. As the NIURP lacks legislative power, its objections took the form
of representations to the Hanoi People's Committee. These overtures were
ignored, which should have allowed the NIURP to formally complain to the
Ministry of Construction. Yet no further action was taken as the project had
attracted high level government support.
Vietnam has never accepted the Anglo-American notion 351 of judicial
review as a genuine method of bringing administration under the rule of
law. On the contrary, most political actors regard any check on discretion-
ary authority a potential threat to political authority. Vietnam's long history
of bureaucratism tends to indicate that patronage has become an intrinsic
part of the economic legal system and is not just a transitory immoral aber-
ration.352  Naturally, groups which are excluded from bureaucratic
348 A. Tay & E. Kamenka, The Future ofAdministrative Justice in the USSR and China, in SOVIET
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THEORY AND POLICY 47-61 (George Ginsburgs ed., 1989). See generally. id.
349 The height of buildings surrounding the lake is not supposed to exceed a notional 45 degree line
rising inland from the lake's edge. See Dao Quong Binh & Jeremy Grant, supra note 264.
350 See Quoc Vinh, Hotel Construction Finally. Under Way, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Feb. 7,
1994, at 5; Ngoc Dung, Long Wait from Licence to Lift-Off, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Feb. 13, 1995, at
24.
351 Compare MARK ARONSON & NICOLA FRANKLIN, REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION I-I1(1987) (evolution of judicial review in Anglo-American legal environments) with Charles Szladits, The
Civil Law System, in 15 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 49-69 (Rene David et
al. eds., 1982) (discussing the judicial review of administrative law under civil law traditions).
352 Nguyen Tran Bat Interview, supra note 173. There appears to be a social differentiation
between patronage and direct payment of bribes. The distinction does not seem to turn on degrees of moral
approbation but raiher on the openness with which an official deviates from an authorized norm. See
generally Wertheim, supra note 284. at 136-40.
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patronage networks find urban-traditional land use more attractive than the
authorized system.
b. Inadequacy of efforts to control bureaucratic discretion
Nevertheless, some influential reformers continue to vigorously
champion bureaucratic accountability. 353 Fearing that patronage and ad hoc
decisions may compromise state policy, reformers have attempted to launch
a party and government campaign 354 to control bureaucratic discretion.
The inadequacies of this campaign, however, are evident. Pressure
for greater bureaucratic accountability appears to be limited to vertical lines
of authority within ministries and between central and local governments.
Current drafts of a law on the organization of the administrative courts
envisage a highly qualified private right to appeal against administrative
discretion. The court must, for example, consider the nebulous "will of the
state" before individual rights.355 Judicial independence is further under-
mined by an obligation, shared with the Fatherland Front and authorized
mass movements, to "struggle, prevent and fight against unlawful violations
in state administrative activities." 356 Unnecessarily complex procedures are
also cause for concern. Furthermore, the establishment of an entirely new
court organization will undoubtedly strain the resources of a judicial system
already critically short of adequately trained judges. 357 Without a political
commitment to the doctrine of separation of powers,358 genuinely independ-
ent review thus remain a pious hope. Such a reform can only be meaningful
353 It should also be noted that the Prime Minister has endorsed a limited form of judicial review of
administrative action in Instruction 6, Resolution No. 38-CP. On Administrative Reform (May 4, 1994).
354 See Resolution No. 38-CP, On Administrative Reform. Office of Government (May 4, 1994);
Phong Lan, supra note 259.
55 See Hoang et al., supra note 223, at 87-88.
356 Id
357 See Sidel, supra note 200, at 221, 224-28.
358 The separation of powers has traditionally been linked with the rule of law as the cornerstone of
Western legal systems. Of course true separation of powers does not exist in any country, indeed to
concentrate absolute power in three separate organs in the absence of proper safeguards is perhaps more
dangerous than a blurring of the distinction between these organs. It is quite likely that if a separation of
powers develops in Vietnam, it will not resemble the balance struck under Western parliamentary systems.
In the meantime, the Vietnamese administration will continue to exercise an unfettered discretion until
some degree of judicial independence is guaranteed. The literature in this area is vast. See, e.g., S.A. DE
SMITH & R. BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 18-22 (1989). For the Vietnamese
official line, see Nguyen Duy Quy. supra note 202.
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in the highly unlikely event that the party abandons the nomenclatura sys-
tem and democratic centralism. 359
Despite its shortcomings, the creation of a judicial forum capable of
reviewing the legality of administrative decisions, acts, omissions, and
delays360 may eventually improve bureaucratic compliance. Review of
bureaucratic discretion can only achieve this goal if land allotment, transfer,
planning, and construction legislation contain judicially discoverable and
manageable standards. Without clear limitations and guidelines, the exer-
cise of discretion is tantamount to the formulation of government policy,
and is therefore beyond judicial review.36 1 Ultimately, unless administra-
tive judgments are backed by enforceable sanctions, they are likely to be
ignored.
Administrative reform has been given a high priority by the state,
though its focus is almost entirely structural. Faults in the system, so it is
argued, may be rectified by streamlining allotment and transfer approvals,
improving the technical competence of cadre, reorganizing ministerial
responsibilities and increasing the vigilance of law enforcement.362 Little
progress has been made to extend the underlying principle of legal reform to
administrative regulation, i.e., that a law-based society should bring greater
regularity to Vietnamese political, economic, and social life.
B. Specific Proposals for Encouragement of Compliance
Vietnam's lawmakers363 are increasingly looking towards local
social, economic, and cultural values as a source of law before turning to
Western rights-based law. This so-called "National Characteristics Model"
359 See supra part IV.A: Seventh Installment of the Basic Contents of the Hanoi 20-25 January
Mid-Term Party National Conference Resolution, SAIGON GIAI PHONG, Mar. 1994, at 3; Communique of
the 8th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee (7th Congress). I VIETNAM L. & LEGAL F. 10, II (Feb.
1995).
360 See Draft Ordinance on Procedure of Settlement of Administrative Cases, art. 2. (sighted by the
author at the Ministry of Justice Information Center).
361 See Laurence H. Tribe. The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
362 Doan Trong Truyen, Administrative Reform, Key Issue for the Reform of the State Apparatus, I
VIETNAM L. & LEGAL F. 30, 30-31 (Oct. 1994): Le Hun Nghia, supra note 196. at 2; Orientations for the
Buildin and Perfection of the Vietnam Socialist Republic State, supra note 98. at 3-6.
3oi interview with Tran The Vuong, Director, Legal Department, National Assembly, in Hanoi,
Vietnam (Sept. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Tran The Vuong Interview]; Do Muoi, Building and Perfecting the
State, I VIETNAM L. & LEGAL F. 3, 7-8 (Feb. 1995); Ngo Bai Thanh, Vietnam 's Integration into a New
Humanist International Order, I VIETNAM L. & LEGAL F. 26, 28-30 (Sept. 1995); Hoang The Lien, supra
note 39, at 34-35.
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is expected to graft the system of administrative guidance onto a conven-
tional legal model. How this will be achieved in practice is a matter for
speculation. Recent land legislation has increased the administrative
discretion of local government without introducing general normative stan-
dards and objective rules of law.
As a top-down system, the conventional legal model tends to discour-
age resort to law by individuals, particularly where there is a conflict
between legal and community norms. 364 Admittedly, the public is surveyed
during the law-making process and their responses are interpreted according
to "scientific principles." However, non-party community groups, and
especially individuals, are usually excluded from the drafting process, the
more so as draft legislation is rarely made public. Ministry of Construction
and General Office of Land Management policy also shows reluctance to
recognize the worth of non-conforming land use. Urban-traditional land
use, for example, continues to be criminalized even in localities where
authorized usage is a fringe phenomenon. Lawmakers, however, are
beginning to show some tentative signs of allowing the public to play a role
in developing planning schemes. 365  As a corollary, more attention is
devoted to publicizing subordinate legislation, although certain ministries
still tend to treat law as state secrets.
However, even the most precisely drafted laws remain ineffective
without an able bureaucracy. This is particularly true in Vietnam, where a
socialist-trained bureaucracy is responsible for administering rights-based
land laws. Exceedingly complicated planning and building procedures,
poor institutional organization and training, and a lack of resources have
already been identified as key impediments to bureaucratic efficiency. The
largely unfettered discretion366 exercised by land administrators has also
been linked to corruption and rent-seeking behavior. However, as the
following tentative propositions suggest, it is equally possible that discre-
tion may be used to enhance compliance.
364 Nguyen Tran Bat Interview, supra note 173; see generally HART, supra note 97, at 124.
365 Ngoc Anh, supra note 288: Interview with Hu Van Que, Assistant to Chief Architect, in Hanoi,
Vietnam (Sept. 14, 1994). The use of custom as a source of law is also gaining importance. See Hoang
The Lien, supra note 39, at 33.
366 Compliance will presumably be enhanced where decision making is based on community
values. See Hoang The Lien, supra note 39, at 35. See generally Raz, supra note 338, at 280-87; HART,
supra note 97, at 24.
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1. Predictability through the Researching, Drafting, and Monitoring of
Decision-Making Guidelines.
Bureaucrats should research, draft, and monitor guidelines describing
the scope and subject matter of decision-making criteria to provide assur-
ance of predictability. A major difficulty constraining legislative drafters is
the paucity of research concerning land use practices. Central-level law-
makers need time to observe rapidly evolving social and economic land use
patterns before codifying general principles of law or prescriptive land use
regulations. Research is hindered by a secretive drafting process that tends
to distance central level lawmakers from community practices, values, and
expectations. Administrators at the local level are closer to these trends. 367
Local administrators have experience resolving social problems where
normative laws provide inadequate guidance, and are more used to drawing
from a protean mixture of party resolutions and moral principles embedded
in Vietnamese culture to resolve such problems.368 On the other hand, the
potential for administrators to use their discretion to cynically plunder cul-
tural principles to support short-term political goals, constitutes a
fundamental risk of the so called National Characteristics Model.
As long as administrative decision making remains vague and unchal-
lengeable, developers need assurance that administrative decisions are
predictable. If bureaucrats are required to research, draft, and monitor
guidelines describing the scope and subject matter of decision-making
criteria, the most efficacious rules could eventually be codified, forming
authoritative community standards that transform observed commercial
practice into knowable legal norms. These standards could be used by the
Ministry of Construction and the General Office of Land Management as
the basis for legislation.369 Thus codified, through a process of acknowl-
367 Note the example of district people's committees applying local custom to determine whether a
land transferor has adequately provided for co-occupiers. See supra part III.B.
368 Nguyen Tran Bat Interview, supra note 173.
369 See Ordinance on Residential Housing, art. 14 (1991). It is possible that courts may also create
a parallel system of law as judgments in the civil division of the people's court concerning housing
disputes contribute to the development of land use standards. Although Vietnam has a civil law system, in
following the Soviet legal model, the Supreme People's Court issues a summary and commentary about
key cases in its annual report. These set out principles of law extracted from a series of analogous cases.
There is some dispute whether they are binding upon inferior courts or can only be treated as guidance.
See Hoang The Lien, supra note 39, at 33: Nguyen Nhu Phat Interview, supra note 101; Wohlegemoth,
supra note 98.
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edgment and internalization, the norms may actively unify and reinforce
acceptable standards of community behavior.
2. Using Patronage Networks to Disseminate Information
Bureaucracy should use patronage networks to disseminate informa-
tion about regional land use practices and win local-level acceptance for
state policy. Land use practices vary considerably in Vietnam, especially
along the urban-rural, north-south, and lowland-highland divides.370 It may
be premature to enact comprehensive, uniform national land use37 1 and
construction legislation 372 in the midst of the current rapid transformation of
land use practices. In the meantime, land and building administrators may
use patronage networks to localize statements of principle enshrined in
national laws. Patron-client relationships can be used to disseminate infor-
mation to local bureaucrats about regional land use practices as well as state
policy. The National Characteristics Model's reliance on local bureaucratic
authority carries with it the risk of regionalization, already a significant
problem in Vietnam.
3. Strengthening Women's Cultural Rights in Land
State policy should encourage the strengthening of women's cultural
rights in land. It has been suggested that positive rights-based laws may
tend to exacerbate a gender imbalance 373 by preferentially allotting land to
individuals and the heads of households. If equal opportunity laws were
introduced, values based on equality of outcomes are unlikely to be rapidly
received into Vietnam's neo-Confucian society.374 The process might be
strengthened, however, if local authorities were required by state policy to
exercise their discretion to strengthen women's cultural rights in land.
370 Seepart III.B.
371 See Steven McFadzean, Recent Developments in Vietnamese Land Law, Asian Studies
Association of Australia Biennial Conference in Perth (July 16, 1994) (unpublished paper).
372 Phan Dinh Dai Interview, supra note 115.
373 See supra part III.D.3.c.
374 The difficulty of attempting to modify people's moral and social values through law. is
discussed by Ngo Ba Thanh, supra note 24, at 28-31; COrERRELL, supra note 59, at 53-58.
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4. Resources for Investigating, Penalizing, and Prosecuting Corrupt
Bureaucrats
State policymakers should allocate resources to sufficiently investi-
gate, penalize and prosecute corrupt bureaucrats. Experience from other
Asian countries 375 suggests that Vietnam's administrative reform program,
which publicly demonizes corrupt officials, promotes according to merit,
trains and retrains, strengthens central control, streamlines procedures, and
improves auditing, 376 is useful; to achieve success, however, three further
steps are needed. First, a reliable and efficient system of information gath-
ering will expose abuses of administrative authority. The press in Vietnam,
for example, have played a significant role in exposing corrupt land offi-
cials. Second, penalties need to be adjusted to match the gravity of the
offense. Finally, an investigating authority should be given the powers and
resources to prosecute officials of all ranks. At present, crime fighters can
also be found amongst the ranks of perpetrators. 377 Through the implemen-
tation of these three steps policymakers can begin to show that bureaucratic
corruption will not be tolerated.
5. Rules to Guide Bureaucratic Decision-Making, Encourage
Negotiation with Developers, and Sever the Financial Link with State
Commercial Enterprises
The state should establish rules to guide bureaucratic decision-
making, encourage negotiation between bureaucracy and developers, and
sever the financial link between bureaucrats and state commercial enter-
prises. Although decision-making can only become accountable to the
public with the support of powerful institutions capable of enforcing rules
against the bureaucracy, 378 prescriptive rules do establish authorized behav-
ioral parameters and reduce the risk of punishment attached to decision
375 See KLITGAARD, supra note 284, at 74-97, 115-3 1.
376 See Doan Trong Truyen, supra note 362, at 30-31.
377 'See Bui Thien Ngo, NHAN DAN. Dec. 23, 1993, at 1; Benedict J. Tri Kerkvliet. Politics of
Society in the Mid 1990s, in DILEMMAS OF DEVELOPMENT: VIETNAM UPDATE 1994, at I, 20-28 (Kerkvliet
ed., 1995).
378 There is considerable evidence that laws change behavior. But the reasons for compliance are
more complex than the convergent values and attitudes of self interest. There is extensive literature in this
area. See generally ROBERTO M. UNGAR, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL
THEORY, ch. 2 (1976); Dror, supra note 187, at 787-93 (on values and attitudes); POSNER, supra note 329;
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 329.
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making. Given the existing uncertainty and absence of such parameters,
however, it is highly likely that inferior level bureaucrats will remain reluc-
tant to make land management decisions, only cautiously exercising their
administrative discretion.
a. Negotiation
Just as important as rules, a dialogue between administrators and
developers allows practical problems to be resolved through negotiation.
The private legal profession is emerging as one of the most influential
bridges between the state and developers. Although sometimes dismissed
as illegitimate intruders interfering with bureaucratic power, attempts by
lawyers to define the boundaries of official authority are being reluctantly
acknowledged. 379 Administrative efficiency may also be enhanced by
simplified land development procedures. The existing complicated
approval processes undoubtedly cause costly delays and create opportuni-
ties for corruption.3 80
b. Law on State Enterprises
Another way rules can change behavior is to reduce the potential for
conflicts of interest by severing the financial link between state officials and
state commercial operations. Probably with some justification, local
autarky is thought 38' to be sustained by revenue derived from profit-making
companies owned or associated with state instrumentalities. The forthcom-
ing law on state enterprises is intended to transform state-owned enterprises
into independent business entities by diverting income away from state
379 Interview with Nguyen Tien Lap, Chief Legal Division Investconsult, in Hanoi, Vietnam (Sept.
30, 1994 and Feb. 10, 1995).
380 See Nguyen Tri Dung, supra note 124; Vo Van Kiet. Report to the 9th Session of the National
Assembly (Dec. 7, 1993), VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV., Nov. 1, 1993. at 3.
381 Interview with Minister Le Xuan Trinh on Administrative Reforms, in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam (Jan. 8 1994), in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-062, Mar. 31, 1994, at 65-66 ("Administrative
reform is an urgent task .... The responsibilities of the central and local organizations must be clearly
determined; and there must be a clear distinction between the responsibilities of the state managemet
organizations and those of the commercial production organizations."); VO VAN KIET, supra note 91, at
20-23.
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supervising agencies 382 to an independent body attached to the Ministry of
Finance.383
Reforms will free state enterprise managers from direct state control,
possibly through the formation of a board of directors selected from candi-
dates outside of the controlling bureaucracy. If decision making no longer
generates a direct financial return, law-makers rather optimistically believe
that officials may be more inclined to impartially discharge state policy. 38 4
For example, the law will sever the above-mentioned nexus between the
chief architect's office and architectural service companies, in theory level-
ing the playing field between state and private architectural service
companies. These changes are intended to allow the private sector to
compete more equally with the state enterprises. This vital aspect of the
economic reform program was constantly delayed by state agencies benefit-
ing from revenue generated by state enterprises. 385
Success is not assured; reforms do not address a pronounced bureau-
cratic antipathy towards private development 386 nor do they extend to
enterprises indirectly controlled by officials and their families.
Unacceptable commercial influence on decision making could be further
quarantined by requiring land management officials to disclose personal and
family assets and benefits received from state and privately owned enter-
prises. The draft law on state enterprises also fails to create a general duty
to avoid conflicts of interest arising from close personal and professional
relationships that subsist between state officials and associated state enter-
prises. These links are likely to remain after income generated by
enterprises is redirected into consolidated revenue.
It is also interesting to speculate whether party influence over state
enterprises, 387 reportedly in decline3 88 since the enactment of Decree
382 See Decision No. 83/TTg, Establishing a Central Steering Committee on Enterprise Reform,
Govt., (March 1993); Nguyen Dinh Loc, Striving for an Integrated System of Economic Laws, 34 VIETNAM
COURIER, Aug. 1992, at 5.
383 Decree No. 34 CP, Tasks, Power and Organizational Mechanism of the General Department for
Managing State Capital and Assets in Enterprises (May 27, 1995).
384 Tran The Vuong Interview, supra note 363.
385 Raymond Mallon, Overview of Recent Developments in State Enterprise Reform in Vietnam,
State Enterprise Reform Program (VIE/91/011) 18-19 (Apr. 1994) (unpublished paper, Government of
Vietnam, UNDP, and World Bank).
386 Vo Dai, Renovation of the Ownership Structure in Vietnam in the Shift to Market Economy, 17
ECON. PROBLEMS, July-Sept. 1992, at 3, 4-6; Vo Nhan Tri & Anne Booth, Recent Economic Developments
in Vietnam, 6 ASIAN-PACIFIC ECON. LITERATURE 16, 23-24 (1992).
387 See Mallon, supra note 192, at 211-12.
388 See Thayer, supra note 44, at 24-25.
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217,389 will expand to fill the power vacuum left by the removal of direct
bureaucratic supervision. Given the party's unchallenged leadership of the
state apparatus, unless it voluntarily relinquishes direct and indirect influ-
ence over state enterprises, legislation is unlikely to be an effective restraint.
This is because party members are disciplined according to internal party
rules and immunity is rarely waived to allow civil suit or criminal prosecu-
tion.390 As one National Assembly member has been quoted as saying,
"[a]s long as violators of the law are treated with tolerance by their old
comrades we will have gaps in our legal system." 391
VI. CONCLUSION
In view of the low levels of compliance with land laws, it is not sur-
prising that the state is reassessing the importance of extra-legal means of
implementing policy.392 The National Assembly has called upon the
Fatherland Front and other mass organizations to motivate the public to
comply with planning and construction laws. The party has a long history
of using ideological apparatus such as mass organizations to augment
bureaucratic implementation of law.393 Mass movements have in the past
been highly effective at maintaining control. They influence behavior
through education and discipline of members. 394
Although there is a clear commitment by the party to instrumental
governance, it is acknowledged that:
the law alone cannot resolve all issues in daily life, which is
full of complicated social problems. As a result, while formu-
389 Decree No. 217 HDBT, Stipulations on Renovation Policies of Planning and Socialist Business
Accounting for State Enterprises, Council of Ministers (Nov. 14, 1987) (sighted by the author at the
Ministry of Justice Information Center). Pursuant to this Decree, state enterprises were granted autonomy
to formulate and implement short, medium, and long term plans for production, free from party or
ministerial intervention.
390 See Vo VAN KIET, supra note 91, at 39-42; Nguyen Thanh Giang, Address to the Central
Committee, Vietnamese Communist Party, VIETNAM INSIGHT (internet SEASIA-L, pts. 1-4 (Sept. and Oct.
1994).
391 Murray Hiebert, Miles to Go: Despite Reform, Legal System Leaves Much to Be Desired, FARE.
ECON. REV., July 29, 1993, at 24-25.
392 Nguyen Ngoc Khoi Interview, supra note 108; Mai Xuan Yen Interview, supra note 70.
393 The current experiment with rule through state instrumentalities only started to gain wide
support after the introduction of D6i M6i (renovation) in 1986.
394 Mechanisms such as the power to demote or promote, as well as to grant or deny access to state
services such as health and education, are used to influence those employed in the state sector. See
Beresford, supra note 222, at 119-24; Thayer, supra note 217, at 21-26.
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lating various laws we must develop our social mechanism and
promote the people's rights to autonomy in managing the
family, ward, village, and community activities to improve
their daily life and to settle social issues through social
contracts. 395
So far, the state has shown little willingness to legitimize those community
values embedded in urban-traditional land use. Instead, administrative
reform in this area has so far been designed to strengthen central authority
so that laws prohibiting illegal occupation and construction are more rigor-
ously enforced. 396 This kind of reform, however, is unlikely to encourage
compliance.
Compliance is more likely to increase when bureaucratic discretion
allows rights-based laws to become more porous and responsive to
urban-traditional values. Towards that end, bureaucratic discretion should
be checked by an independent and widely accessible system of review;
otherwise top-down reform may simply replace one patronage network with
another.
Recognizing that bureaucratic rule has failed to control urban devel-
opment and that foreign laws are rarely politically or economically
appropriate, lawmakers are looking inwards at local customary practice and
cultural values as sources of land law. This so-called National
Characteristics Model, however is a long-term strategy. In the meantime,
the National Assembly has called upon the Fatherland Front and other mass
organizations to motivate the public to comply with planning and construc-
tion laws. It is possible that these organizations can achieve what the
bureaucracy cannot, though in a "mixed market" economy it is unclear
whether mass organizations still command sufficient respect to change
social attitudes.
395 Land Transferred to Farmers in 47 Provinces, supra note 77, at 57.
396 Land Transferred to Farmers in 47 Provinces, supra note 77, at 57; Vu Oanh, supra note 51, at
3; Let Us Continue to Renovate the Party-Initiated Mass Mobilisation Work in the New Situation (NHAN
DAN, Sept. 21, 1993), translated in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 93-201, at 3; Assembly Issues Anti-
Corruption Resolution (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam, Dec. 30, 1993), in F.B.I.S. DAILY REP. - E. ASIA 94-007,
Jan. II, 1994, at 53-54.
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